Everything in the world is in motion. . . .
Life changes, productive forces grow, old relations collapse.
‒Karl Marx
Marxism is not only the theory of socialism, it is an integral world outlook, a philosophical system, from which Marx’s proletarian socialism logically follows. This philosophical system is called dialectical materialism.
Hence, to expound Marxism means to expound also dialectical materialism.
Why is this system called dialectical materialism?
Because its method is dialectical, and its theory is materialistic.
What is the dialectical method?
It is said that social life is in continual motion and development. And that is true: life must not be regarded as something immutable and static; it never remains at one level, it is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation. Therefore, life always contains the new and the old, the growing and the dying, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary.
The dialectical method tells us that we must regard life as it actually is. We have seen that life is in continual motion; consequently, we must regard life in its motion and ask: Where is life going? We have seen that life presents a picture of constant destruction and creation; consequently, we must examine life in its process of destruction and creation and ask: What is being destroyed and what is being created in life?
That which in life is born and grows day by day is invincible, its progress cannot be checked. That is to say, if, for example, in life the proletariat as a class is born and grows day by day, no matter how weak and small in numbers it may be today, in the long run it must triumph. Why? Because it is growing, gaining strength and marching forward. On the other hand, that which in life is growing old and advancing to its grave must inevitably suffer defeat, even if today it represents a titanic force. That is to say, if, for example, the bourgeoisie is gradually losing ground and is slipping farther and farther back every day, then, no matter how strong and numerous it may be today, it must, in the long run, suffer defeat. Why? Because as a class it is decaying, growing feeble, growing old, and becoming a burden to life.
Hence arose the well-known dialectical proposition: all that which really exists, i.e., all that which grows day by day is rational, and all that which decays day by day is irrational and, consequently, cannot avoid defeat.
For example. In the eighties of the last century a great controversy flared up among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. The Narodniks asserted that the main force that could undertake the task of “emancipating Russia” was the petty bourgeoisie, rural and urban. Why?—the Marxists asked them. Because, answered the Narodniks, the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie now constitute the majority and, moreover, they are poor, they live in poverty.
To this the Marxists replied: It is true that the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie now constitute the majority and are really poor, but is that the point? The petty bourgeoisie has long constituted the majority, but up to now it has displayed no initiative in the struggle for “freedom” without the assistance of the proletariat. Why? Because the petty bourgeoisie as a class is not growing; on the contrary, it is disintegrating day by day and breaking up into bourgeois and proletarians. On the other hand, nor is poverty of decisive importance here, of course: “tramps” are poorer than the petty bourgeoisie, but nobody will say that they can undertake the task of “emancipating Russia.”
As you see, the point is not which class today constitutes the majority, or which class is poorer, but which class is gaining strength and which is decaying.
And as the proletariat is the only class which is steadily growing and gaining strength, which is pushing social life forward and rallying all the revolutionary elements around itself, our duty is to regard it as the main force in the present-day movement, join its ranks and make its progressive strivings our strivings.
That is how the Marxists answered.
Obviously the Marxists looked at life dialectically, whereas the Narodniks argued metaphysically—they pictured social life as having become static at a particular stage.
That is how the dialectical method looks upon the development of life.
But there is movement and movement. There was movement in social life during the “December days,” when the proletariat, straightening its back, stormed arms depots and launched an attack upon reaction. But the movement of preceding years, when the proletariat, under the conditions of “peaceful” development, limited itself to individual strikes and the formation of small trade unions, must also be called social movement.
Clearly, movement assumes different forms.
And so the dialectical method says that movement has two forms: the evolutionary and the revolutionary form.
Movement is evolutionary when the progressive elements spontaneously continue their daily activities and introduce minor, quantitative changes into the old order.
Movement is revolutionary when the same elements combine, become imbued with a single idea and sweep down upon the enemy camp with the object of uprooting the old order and of introducing qualitative changes in life, of establishing a new order.
Evolution prepares for revolution and creates the ground for it; revolution consummates the process of evolution and facilitates its further activity.
Similar processes take place in nature. The history of science shows that the dialectical method is a truly scientific method: from astronomy to sociology, in every field we find confirmation of the idea that nothing is eternal in the universe, everything changes, everything develops. Consequently, everything in nature must be regarded from the point of view of movement, development. And this means that the spirit of dialectics permeates the whole of present-day science.
As regards the forms of movement, as regards the fact that according to dialectics, minor, quantitative changes sooner or later lead to major, qualitative changes—this law applies with equal force to the history of nature. Mendeleyev’s “periodic system of elements” clearly shows how very important in the history of nature is the emergence of qualitative changes out of quantitative changes. The same thing is shown in biology by the theory of neo-Lamarckism, to which neo-Darwinism is yielding place.
We shall say nothing about other facts, on which F. Engels has thrown sufficiently full light in his Anti-Dühring.
Such is the content of the dialectical method.
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How do the Anarchists look upon the dialectical method?
Everybody knows that Hegel was the father of the dialectical method. Marx purged and improved this method. The Anarchists are aware of this, of course. They know that Hegel was a conservative, and so, taking advantage of this, they vehemently revile Hegel as a supporter of “restoration,” they try with the utmost zeal to “prove” that “Hegel is a philosopher of restoration . . . that he eulogizes bureaucratic constitutionalism in its absolute form, that the general idea of his philosophy of history is subordinate to and serves the philosophical trend of the period of restoration,” and so on and so forth. (see Nobati,2 No. 6. Article by V. Cherkezishvili.)
The well-known Anarchist Kropotkin tries to “prove” the same thing in his works (see, for example, his Science and Anarchism, in Russian).
Our Kropotkinites, from Cherkezishvili right down to Sh. G., all with one voice echo Kropotkin. (see Nobati)
True, nobody contests what they say on this point; on the contrary, everybody agrees that Hegel was not a revolutionary. Marx and Engels themselves proved before anybody else did, in their Critique of Critical Criticism, that Hegel’s views on history fundamentally contradict the idea of the sovereignty of the people. But in spite of this, the Anarchists go on trying to “prove,” and deem it necessary to go on day in and day out trying to “prove,” that Hegel was a supporter of “restoration.” Why do they do this? Probably, in order by all this to discredit Hegel and make their readers feel that the “reactionary” Hegel’s method also cannot be other than “repugnant” and unscientific.
The Anarchists think that they can refute the dialectical method in this way.
We affirm that in this way they can prove nothing but their own ignorance. Pascal and Leibnitz were not revolutionaries, but the mathematical method they discovered is recognised today as a scientific method. Mayer and Helmholtz were not revolutionaries, but their discoveries in the field of physics became the basis of science. Nor were Lamarck and Darwin revolutionaries, but their evolutionary method put biological science on its feet… Why, then, should the fact not be admitted that, in spite of his conservatism, Hegel succeeded in working out a scientific method which is called the dialectical method?
No, in this way the Anarchists will prove nothing but their own ignorance.
To proceed. In the opinion of the Anarchists, “dialectics is metaphysics,” and as they “want to free science from metaphysics, philosophy from theology,” they repudiate the dialectical method. (see Nobati, Nos. 3 and 9. Sh. G. See also Kropotkin’s Science and Anarchism)
Oh, those Anarchists! As the saying goes: “Blame others for your own sins.” Dialectics matured in the struggle against metaphysics and gained fame in this struggle; but according to the Anarchists, dialectics is metaphysics!
Dialectics tells us that nothing in the world is eternal, everything in the world is transient and mutable; nature changes, society changes, habits and customs change, conceptions of justice change, truth itself changes—that is why dialectics regards everything critically; that is why it denies the existence of a once-and-for-all established truth. Consequently, it also repudiates abstract “dogmatic propositions, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart” (see F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach).3
Metaphysics, however, tells us something altogether different. From its standpoint the world is something eternal and immutable, (see F. Engels, Anti-Dühring) it has been once and for all determined by someone or something—that is why the metaphysicians always have “eternal justice” or “immutable truth” on their lips.
Proudhon, the “father” of the Anarchists, said that there existed in the world an immutable justice determined once and for all, which must be made the basis of future society. That is why Proudhon has been called a metaphysician. Marx fought Proudhon with the aid of the dialectical method and proved that since everything in the world changes, “justice” must also change, and that, consequently, “immutable justice” is metaphysical nonsense (see K. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy). The Georgian disciples of the metaphysician Proudhon, however, keep reiterating that “Marx’s dialectics is metaphysics”!
Metaphysics recognises various nebulous dogmas, such as, for example, the “unknowable,” the “thing-in-itself,” and, in the long run, passes into empty theology. In contrast to Proudhon and Spencer, Engels combated these dogmas with the aid of the dialectical method (see Ludwig Feuerbach); but the Anarchists—the disciples of Proudhon and Spencer—tell us that Proudhon and Spencer were scientists, whereas Marx and Engels were metaphysicians!
One of two things: either the Anarchists are deceiving themselves, or else they do not know what they are talking about.
At all events, it is beyond doubt that the Anarchists confuse Hegel’s metaphysical system with his dialectical method.
Needless to say, Hegel’s philosophical system, which rests on the immutable idea, is from beginning to end metaphysical. But it is also clear that Hegel’s dialectical method, which repudiates all immutable ideas, is from beginning to end scientific and revolutionary.
That is why Karl Marx, who subjected Hegel’s metaphysical system to devastating criticism, at the same time praised his dialectical method, which, as Marx said, “lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary” (see Capital, Vol. I. Preface).
That is why Engels sees a big difference between Hegel’s method and his system. “Whoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian system could be fairly conservative in both spheres; whoever regarded the dialectical method as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion” (see Ludwig Feuerbach).
The Anarchists fail to see this difference and thoughtlessly maintain that “dialectics is metaphysics.”
To proceed. The Anarchists say that the dialectical method is “subtle word-weaving,” “the method of sophistry,” “logical somersaults” (see Nobati, No. 8. Sh. G.), “with the aid of which both truth and falsehood are proved with equal facility” (see Nobati, No. 4. Article by V. Cherkezishvili).
Thus, in the opinion of the Anarchists, the dialectical method proves both truth and falsehood.
At first sight it would seem that the accusation advanced by the Anarchists has some foundation. Listen, for example, to what Engels says about the follower of the metaphysical method:
“. . . His communication is: ‘Yea, yea; nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.’ For him a thing either exists, or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another . . .” (see Anti-Dühring. Introduction).
How is that?—the Anarchists cry heatedly. Is it possible for a thing to be good and bad at the same time?! That is “sophistry,” “juggling with words,” it shows that “you want to prove truth and falsehood with equal facility”! . . .
Let us, however, go into the substance of the matter.
Today we are demanding a democratic republic. Can we say that a democratic republic is good in all respects, or bad in all respects? No we cannot! Why? Because a democratic republic is good only in one respect: when it destroys the feudal system; but it is bad in another respect: when it strengthens the bourgeois system. Hence we say: in so far as the democratic republic destroys the feudal system it is good—and we fight for it; but in so far as it strengthens the bourgeois system it is bad—and we fight against it.
So the same democratic republic can be “good” and “bad” at the same time—it is “yes” and “no.”
The same thing may be said about the eight-hour day, which is good and bad at the same time: “good” in so far as it strengthens the proletariat, and “bad” in so far as it strengthens the wage system.
It was facts of this kind that Engels had in mind when he characterised the dialectical method in the words we quoted above.
The Anarchists, however, fail to understand this, and an absolutely clear idea seems to them to be nebulous “sophistry.”
The Anarchists are, of course, at liberty to note or ignore these facts, they may even ignore the sand on the sandy seashore—they have every right to do that. But why drag in the dialectical method, which, unlike anarchism, does not look at life with its eyes shut, which has its finger on the pulse of life and openly says: since life changes and is in motion, every phenomenon of life has two trends: a positive and a negative; the first we must defend, the second we must reject.
To proceed further. In the opinion of our Anarchists, “dialectical development is catastrophic development, by means of which, first the past is utterly destroyed, and then the future is established quite separately. . . . Cuvier’s cataclysms were due to unknown causes, but Marx and Engels’s catastrophes are engendered by dialectics” (see Nobati, No. 8. Sh. G.).
In another place the same author writes: “Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically” (see Nobati, No. 6).
Now listen!
Cuvier rejects Darwin’s theory of evolution, he recognises only cataclysms, and cataclysms are unexpected upheavals “due to unknown causes.” The Anarchists say that the Marxists adhere to Cuvier’s view and therefore repudiate Darwinism.
Darwin rejects Cuvier’s cataclysms, he recognises gradual evolution. But the same Anarchists say that “Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically,” i.e., the Marxists repudiate Cuvier’s cataclysms.
In short, the Anarchists accuse the Marxists of adhering to Cuvier’s view and at the same time reproach them for adhering to Darwin’s and not to Cuvier’s view.
This is anarchy if you like! As the saying goes: the Sergeant’s widow flogged herself! Clearly, Sh. G. of No. 8 of Nobati forgot what Sh. G. of No. 6 said.
Which is right: No. 8 or No. 6?
Let us turn to the facts. Marx says:
“At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations. . . . Then begins an epoch of social revolution.” But “no social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed . . .” (see K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Preface). 4
If this thesis of Marx is applied to modern social life, we shall find that between the present-day productive forces, which are social in character, and the form of appropriation of the product, which is private in character, there is a fundamental conflict which must culminate in the socialist revolution (see F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, Part III, Chapter II).
As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution is engendered not by Cuvier’s “unknown causes,” but by very definite and vital social causes called “the development of the productive forces.”
As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution comes only when the productive forces have sufficiently matured, and not unexpectedly, as Cuvier thought.
Clearly, there is nothing in common between Cuvier’s cataclysms and Marx’s dialectical method.
On the other hand, Darwinism repudiates not only Cuvier’s cataclysms, but also dialectically understood development, which includes revolution; whereas, from the standpoint of the dialectical method, evolution and revolution, quantitative and qualitative changes, are two essential forms of the same motion.
Obviously, it is also wrong to assert that “Marxism . . . treats Darwinism uncritically.”
It turns out therefore, that Nobati is wrong in both cases, in No. 6 as well as in No. 8.
Lastly, the Anarchists tell us reproachfully that “dialectics . . . provides no possibility of getting, or jumping, out of oneself, or of jumping over oneself” (see Nobati, No. 8. Sh. G.).
Now that is the downright truth, Messieurs Anarchists! Here you are absolutely right, my dear sirs: the dialectical method does not, indeed, provide such a possibility. But why not? Because “jumping out of oneself, or jumping over oneself” is an exercise for wild goats, while the dialectical method was created for human beings.
That is the secret! . . .
Such, in general, are the Anarchists’ views on the dialectical method.
Clearly, the Anarchists fail to understand the dialectical method of Marx and Engels; they have conjured up their own dialectics, and it is against this dialectics that they are fighting so ruthlessly.
All we can do is to laugh as we gaze at this spectacle, for one cannot help laughing when one sees a man fighting his own imagination, smashing his own inventions, while at the same time heatedly asserting that he is smashing his opponent.