The Cold War & Its Origins, 1917–1960. Vol.I, 1917–1950

During the last weeks of 1945 long speeches began to be made in the United States Senate revealing the deepest aversion to the Soviet Union and a corresponding desire to deal with her sternly.

Stop Appeasing Russia. Senator Burton K. Wheeler, of Montana, led off, on November 27, with a speech filling twenty-three pages in the Congressional Record, less a moderate amount of interruption. Wheeler was one of the many isolationists who were catapulted into the war by Pearl Harbor. Now that the war was over they were ready to say “I told you so” with a vengeance. Wheeler declared that Truman had “inherited an almost insoluble situation—one which some of us foresaw was the inevitable consequence of policies pursued before Pearl Harbor.” Now, “something terrible is happening to America and the world. . . . We confront the greatest crisis in human history.”

Before explaining what the catastrophe was, Wheeler proclaimed triumphantly that the entire world was out of control. He read quotations describing bad conditions all over the globe. Then he launched into a long assault upon the Soviet Union, defining the issue as not communism, but “power—sheer, naked and unadulterated power.” He listed all the territories annexed by Russia, from Finnish Karelia to Bessarabia. Then he called the roll of the satellite countries dominated by the Soviets, from Finland all the way around to the Far East.

Why had all this happened? “The only reason why, to this moment, Russia has had a free hand to liquidate all potential opposition, both among organized patriotic resistance groups and among the disorganized helplessly miserable masses, is because we have been willing not only to shield her and keep the facts from the American people but also because, by our abject appeasement for the sake of a specious unity, we have deliberately played her game for her.”

Being a very able lawyer, Wheeler had chosen his point of attack shrewdly. The great bulk of the American people knew that Allied appeasement of the Fascist dictators had been an abysmal failure. Americans also hate being suckers, especially a second time. If therefore they could be convinced that they were starting down the slippery path of appeasement again, or already sliding rapidly down it, they would be certain to react sharply. It would, moreover, be relatively easy to make that charge stick. The great backlog of pre-war distrust and fear of Communist Russia could be stirred to red heat without too much effort.

Proceeding, Wheeler charged that “our appeasement, our betrayal of principles, our abandonment of human beings to a fate worse than death have made Europe and Asia a veritable chamber of horrors.” He inserted dozens of quotations, many dealing with the raping of German women by Russian troops, to show how horrible conditions were, and asserted that “we dare not look for one moment longer with the blurred vision of hate, of revenge, of fear, upon an enemy whose predicament now threatens the greatest human catastrophe in history.”

After further pages of material to create sympathy for Germany, and charging that “every step” which Russia had taken since the San Francisco Conference showed that she intended “to go her way for power, power and more power,” he declared that “we must quit appeasing Russia and let her know once and for all that we did not fight this war to let her enslave the people of Europe.”¹

The charge that Russia controlled Eastern Europe merely because we appeased her was, of course, without foundation. She was there because the pre-war Allied effort to turn Hitler to the East had backfired. Far from wanting to prevent her entry into East Europe we had been keenly afraid she might stop on her own borders, but myriads of Americans would forget their history and bristle at the idea of appeasing the Reds.

Russia a World Aggressor. On December 4 Senator James O. Eastland, of Mississippi, took up the cudgels in favor of Germany. He quoted five long rape stories from the Patterson press, The Washington Times and The New York Daily News, before asserting that “even communistic periodicals are admitting that ten to fifteen million Germans will die of starvation this winter.”

Germany had served both as a neutralizing agent and a barrier between the Oriental hordes and the West for 2000 years. Now “we find in Czechoslovakia savage, barbarian Mongolian hordes stalking the streets of western civilization as conquerors” and thinking of engulfing Western Europe. We could not permit Germany to become a satellite of Russia. Germany was the keystone of Europe. We must hold Western Europe. He shuddered to think what a union of Russia and Germany under the banner of communism would mean. The American people “must realize that Russia is a predatory, aggressor nation, and that today she follows the same fateful road of conquest and aggression with which Adolph Hitler set the world on fire.”²

This speech came close to justifying the Nazi racial theories and very near to saying that we had backed the wrong horse in supporting the savage Russians against the civilized Germans. It implied also, as had Wheeler, that we should change sides and back the Germans against the Reds. Before long many Americans would be planning to arm Germany again. But the really pregnant part of Eastland’s speech was the charge that Russia was another aggressor, just as bad as Hitler.

This was another analogy that would be widely accepted without examination, as it was repeated over and over again in coming months. Together the cry “No More Appeasement” and the slogan “Another Aggressor” made a potent combination. The moral was perfectly plain. If another aggressor is on the march we must stop this thing now. Delay only makes matters worse.

Probably the Senators did not originate these slogans. Russian control of Eastern Europe would be enough to set them afloat, even if the excesses committed by the Russian troops, especially after VE Day, had not added fuel to Western resentment. A Stop-Russia movement was inherent in the great expansion of Russian power. It mushroomed so rapidly that before two years had passed a large majority of Americans would be sure that Russia was out to conquer the world.

Ederfs Appraisal. Contemporaneous with Eastland’s charge that Russia was an aggressor, just as dangerous as Hitler, Anthony Eden discussed Russia’s motives in the House of Commons, on November 22, 1945. Chiding the Russians for thinking that any plans for the organization of Western Europe must be aimed at them, he avowed his full belief that Russia’s arrangements in East Europe were directed against a German resurgence. They were not aimed at Britain. He was “convinced it is the literal truth. We know that Russian arrangements are not aimed against us.”³

This was the testimony of one of the most responsible of all British statesmen. He knew, as did any student of the war, that Russian policy in East Europe was dominated by the most powerful and poignant defensive purposes and emotions. But the immensely powerful anti-Russian and anti-Communist influences in the United States, both lay and clerical, gave no recognition to history. Russia in East Europe was a brutal, barbaric aggressor, obviously out to conquer the world.

Atomic World Power. Opportunely, too, the atomic bomb had provided a weapon with which we could stop this new menace. It enabled us to defend the United States against Russian “aggression,” easily, surely and cheaply.

Senator Edwin Johnson, of Colorado, leading member of the Military Affairs Committee, explained it to the Senate on November 28. We had the blueprints for a new plane with a flying range of 10,000 miles. “Therefore, with the strategic location of airfields from the Philippines to Alaska, on the coast of Asia, from Alaska to the Azores in the South Atlantic, we can drop, on a moment’s notice, atomic bombs on any spot on the earth’s surface and return to our base.”

We dared not contemplate a defense program of lesser scope, Johnson said. Would the world like it? He thought most of it would, but no matter: “With vision and guts and plenty of atomic bombs, ultra-modern planes, and strategically located air-bases the United States can outlaw wars of aggression. . . .” The courage to do it was also the price of survival.

And the United Nations? “The world organization which I am thinking of is one designed to stop war with the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States as the club behind the door, to be used only when a bandit nation goes berserk.”

Evidently there was still such a nation loose in the world. Johnson strongly opposed the talk of inevitable war with Russia, but he admonished her: “Don’t make the fatal mistake of pushing us around. We won’t take it.”⁴

Senator Johnson meant well by the world. He did not mean to hurt anyone. All he asked was the power to atom bomb “on a moment’s notice” any nation which misbehaved. The Russians would have nothing to worry about so long as they conducted themselves properly, according to his standards.

Moscow Conference, December 1945

On Thanksgiving Day Secretary Byrnes remembered that the three Foreign Ministers were supposed to meet every three months. He cabled to Moscow and an invitation to meet there was promptly issued.

Atomic Prelude. Before he left Washington Byrnes called in about a dozen Senators to tell them what he proposed to say to the Russians about the atomic bomb. Some Senators got the impression that he was going to assume Russian cooperation in international control and to discuss the bomb question frankly with them. They promptly suggested that he should not assume cooperation and that no additional secrets about the bomb should be discussed until the Russians had opened their atomic laboratories and factories to inspection. The meeting was long and sometimes angry. It included protests that the Senators should be consulted, not informed about what the Secretary proposed to do.⁵

Decisions. Aided by three meetings between Byrnes and Stalin, which were marked by a “combination of frankness and cordiality” on Stalin’s part, the conference reached agreement on several issues.⁶

Most important was the formula for making treaties of peace with the German satellites. The first draft of the treaty for each country would be drawn up by the powers which had signed the armistice, France being added to the group which would prepare the Italian treaty. In Finland’s case only Russia and Great Britain would participate. The Big Three would write the treaties for the Balkan states.

When all the drafts were ready they would be submitted to a conference of twenty-one states, including all those which had done some real fighting in the European theater. India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ethiopia were added to the European Allies and the United States.

After consideration by the peace conference the final texts of the treaties would be drawn up by the same powers which had prepared the original drafts. They would be submitted in each case to the other allies who had declared war, but would come into force when ratified by all of the armistice signatories, i.e. by the Great Powers, and by the enemy states in question.

This was substantially a victory for the Russian position, yet it provided for public review and debate of each treaty by the smaller allies concerned. It was a fair compromise between the Russian desire to keep decisions in as few hands as possible and the Anglo-American insistence upon democratic procedure.

The Council also set up a Far Eastern Commission, with headquarters in Washington, to formulate policies and standards for the fulfilment of Japan’s treaty obligations and to review policy directives of the Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. An Allied Council for Japan, with its seat in Tokyo, was created to meet with the Supreme Commander. Each of its members had the power to suspend certain of his directives, pending appeal to the Far Eastern Commission. All of the states which had fought Japan were named members of both bodies.

Other measures provided for: (a) a Soviet American conference in Korea and a joint commission to prepare a provisional democratic government for her; (b) the withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops from China; (c) a three-power commission which would proceed to Rumania and help King Michael install a member of the National Peasant Party and a representative of the Liberal party in the cabinet, as a preliminary to free and unfettered elections with full freedom of press, speech and assembly; and (d) action by the Soviet Government to see that two representatives of democratic groups were added to the Bulgarian cabinet. After the completion of these measures the Western powers would recognize the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments.

The last section of the Moscow communique provided for the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Byrnes had placed this item first on his proposed agenda, but Molotov moved it to last place, to show his nonchalance about the A-bomb. When they came to the subject he objected seriously to the key requirement about proceeding by stages, but subsided when its indispensability was insisted upon. The Washington atomic energy agreement of November 15 was approved, with a stipulation safeguarding the rights of the Security Council. The Russian leaders never mentioned the atomic bomb at either the London or Moscow Council meetings, except to refer jokingly to Byrnes and President Conant, of Harvard, having perhaps little atomic bombs in their pockets.⁷

Atomic Postscript. When the communique was issued, Senator Vandenberg hurried to the White House in anxiety about the atomic energy part of it. The listing of “inspection and control” as the final stage suggested to him and other Senators that, after all, Byrnes had agreed to disclose the vital secrets at some earlier stage. Having been reassured, Vandenberg issued a calming statement.⁸

In his radio report on December 30 Byrnes discussed the matter of atomic secrecy as follows: “it was intended and it is understood that the matter of safeguards will apply to the recommendations of the commission in relation to every phase of the subject and at every stage.”

Progress. When Byrnes returned he was surprised that a portion of the press greeted the Moscow agreements as “appeasement.” Much of this criticism, he recorded, “unfortunately came from people so unreasonably anti-Soviet in their views that they would regard any agreement upon any subject as appeasement.”⁹

The Moscow meeting had gone far toward recognizing the inevitable in Eastern Europe, by providing for steps looking toward recognition of all the East European regimes. The Tito Government in Yugoslavia was recognized on December 23. The great power veto was also extended to the peace settlements and the control of atomic energy. If these were debits, the impasse among the powers had been broken and machinery established for the making of peace. Byrnes was justly congratulated by Cordell Hull on the splendid progress made at Moscow. Hull added that “Understanding, confidence, friendliness, and the whole spirit of international cooperation have greatly improved the work of this conference.”¹⁰

However, Byrnes’ conduct of the Moscow conference lost him the confidence of President Truman, and after an interval, his post as Secretary of State. He had neglected to keep in touch with the President, had issued a communique about the conference and asked for national radio time without consulting him. When Truman read the communique he did not like it.

“There was not a word about Iran or any other place where the Soviets were on the march,” and after studying the conference records he concluded that Byrnes had “taken it upon himself to move the foreign policy of the United States in a direction to which I could not and would not agree.”

He therefore reprimanded Byrnes strongly and on January 5, 1946. read personally to him a letter in which he insisted upon protest “with all the vigor of which we are capable against the Russian program in Iran. . . . Another outrage if I ever saw one.” There wasn’t a doubt in his mind “that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean.” Unless Russia was “faced with an iron fist and strong language” another war was in the making. Then after outlining a strong program for the Straits, Japan, China, Korea and the settlement of Russia’s lend-lease debt, he closed with the declaration: “I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”

This memorandum was “the point of departure in our foreign policy,” Truman declared later. “I’m tired of babying the Soviets,’ I had said to Byrnes, and I meant it.”¹¹

After all, then, Byrnes had not succeeded in making peace at Moscow, or greatly forwarding it, as the world thought, except as he had laid down procedures for making the satellite peace treaties which carried through. Behind him was an angry President, still smarting from not being able to do anything at the Potsdam conference about the “Russian occupation of Eastern Poland and the occupation of that part of Germany east of the Oder River by Poland.” “It was a high handed outrage,” he said, and in the Japanese war “we found later that we didn’t need Russia there and that the Russians have been a headache to us ever since.”¹²

Therefore, while everyone thought that tensions were being relaxed and peace made, the Truman Doctrine was boiling in the President’s mind. He had been unable to prevent Stalin from moving Poland westward and occupying East Europe, but he would see to it that Russia achieved no other gains from the war. It is a little difficult to set down the occasions on which we had babied the Russians, but Mr. Truman’s inability to block the consolidation of their war time gains seemed like that to him, and there would be no more of it.

The London UN Sessions—January, 1946

Russian Aims in ban. During November 1945 it became evident that Russia was making an effort to retain control of the province of Azerbaijan in North Iran, which her troops still occupied under the war time agreement with Britain. An autonomy movement received Russian support, to the point that 1200 Iranian troops were stopped from marching into the province. It appeared that Russia expected to consolidate her hold on it before Russian troops were due to leave on March 2, 1946.

British-Russian rivalry in Iran was of long standing. In 1907 the Russo-British Entente had been founded mainly on a division of Iran into three zones, with North Iran conceded as the Russian sphere. If Russia had been a victor in World War I she would doubtless have kept this area, whose people were racially and linguistically a part of the large body of Azerbaijanians north of the border.

Since Russia was a loser in 1918, she not only gave up North Iran but found British troops occupying her own great oil fields, just north of the Iranian border, and when Turkish troops occupied Batum they slaughtered 30,000 Armenians in September 1918. During the Russo-Finnish war of 1939–40, as described in an earlier chapter, the Franco-British allies long pondered plans to bomb the Baku oil fields from the Middle East. Russia therefore had some reason to be nervous about her vital oil supplies, if power rivalry was to be the order of the day.

Two other motives were involved. Because of anxiety about her oil fields the Russians had been demanding the return of two Turkish provinces, Kars and Ardahan, near Baku, which had been ceded to Turkey during Russia’s weakness after World War I. This demand had been featured in the Moscow press during the Moscow Conference in December. Linked to it was Russia’s bid for a share in the military control of the Dardanelles. Since both demands were rebuffed by the West, Soviet control of Azerbaijan would both outflank Turkey and be an important step toward a warm water exit on the Persian Gulf. The outflanking theory was at once put forward in Middle Eastern diplomatic circles in Paris. The Russians, wrote Herbert L. Matthews from London, “as always, are seeking security and in this case security for their great and vulnerable oil region,” from which they drew 80% of their oil. Involved also was their perennial longing for warm water ports and, above all, the Dardanelles, “the chief bone of contention between Britain and Russia for centuries.”¹³

Russia’s desire for an oil concession in North Iran was another leading factor. For decades the British had been taking great quantities of oil from South Iran. The Russians desired to exploit North Iran, partly because they feared that their own fields might be drained by wells south of the border. It was sometimes said that Russia did not need oil, but this was not true in view of the fuel needs of any large expanding economy and of the recent war damage in her own oilfields. She also naturally desired to share in Middle East oil takings, since the West had fabulous holdings in Iran, Arabia and Iraq.

Social Conditions. Another consideration offered justification for aggressive action to communist minds. Iran was still governed by feudal landlords, who kept the people in a state of squalor hardly equalled anywhere on the globe. A hint of the situation was contained in a dispatch of February 28, 1946, saying that the rebel forces were overrunning some of the 130 villages owned by Mohammed Zolfaghani, and he and his private guerillas were putting up a stiff resistance.¹⁴

Investigating for the New York Times Clifton Daniel found in Iran that less than one per cent of the land was owned by small holders. The rest was in the hands of landlords, 75 per cent of whom lived in the towns. Some holdings exceeded 100 square miles in extent. On these great estates the people lived in a state of peonage, the croppers commonly receiving one-fifth of their crops. In some villages 90 per cent of the people had malaria, and infant mortality exceeded 50 per cent. It was widely recognized that the government was narrowly based on a ruling class representing perhaps 2 per cent of the people. There was no tax on land. Tax evasion was rife and the bribery of tax collectors was generally practised. All civil servants were so poorly paid that graft was inevitable and what moneys were collected were sucked into Teheran and largely disappeared in costly administration.

The result was “a nation in rags.” Abject misery was graven on most faces. Even in Teheran anyone standing on the street would be approached by a beggar every five minutes. Many observers agreed that the country was ripe for revolution. Iranian friends of the Soviet Union looked “to Iran’s great neighbor for deliverance from economic feudalism.” Daniel added that Azerbaijanians on either side of the border were indistinguishable in speech and appearance.¹⁵

Iran Charges Aggression. Byrnes and Bevin had made strong efforts to discuss the Iranian crisis at Moscow in December, but without success. When the United Nations Assembly and Security Council met in London for their organization sessions, early in January 1946, the Iranian delegate consulted Bevin and Byrnes about bringing the case before the Security Council. Both were very reluctant to have the Council hale Russia before it as its first act.

Bevin tried to dissuade Iran, and Byrnes had sought to forestall a UN crisis by settling the matter at Moscow. Concluding, however, that if he moved they would support him, the Iranian delegate brought up the question on January 15, reserving the right to make a formal charge if an early settlement was not reached. Four days later he did so, saying that Russia was interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.

Russian Countercharge: Greece. Believing that Britain had instigated or abetted the Iranian move, Russia retaliated, on January 21, by indicting the presence of British troops in Greece. Vishinsky charged that they were used to exercise pressure on the Greek nation, suppressing the democratic elements and supporting the reactionary ones, a situation which might ultimately endanger the peace.

In addition to the retaliatory impulse, the Russians felt that the British had, broken the spheres of influence agreement made at Moscow in October 1944 by their insistence on free elections in Eastern Europe. If Russian troops could not make a Russian sphere in Iran they wished to know what Western troops were doing in Greece, Indonesia, Syria-Lebanon, Iceland, and other areas.

Before the Russian charges about Greece there had been much protest in the British press, and in the Labor Party, about Britain’s role in Greece. Now suddenly the entire British press united to condemn Russia’s tactics.¹⁶ The explanation was a feeling that if Russia insisted on an exclusive sphere of control in East Europe she should leave the Mediterranean and the Middle East to Britain. This was the reverse of the Russian feeling that since they had conceded Greece to Britain, she ought not to interfere in the Balkans.

Originally the Russians had adhered to their bargain, as Churchill attested in his letter of March 8, 1945, to Roosevelt.¹⁷

In the Security Council, on February 2, Bevin vehemently denied the Russian charges, asserting that British troops had saved Greece from terrorism, massacres and mayhem. Besides they were there by the desire of the Greek Government. This was of course warmly attested by the Greek representative. Bevin could not “submit to the condemnation of the Soviet Government either by inference or implication.” He would not accept any resolution which looked forward to the withdrawal of British troops from Greece.

For the United States, Stettinius held that no threat to the peace had been shown and when the Polish delegate agreed the issue was dropped. Perhaps necessarily the Russians had framed their charge too broadly. It was obvious that British domination in Greece did not at that time threaten the peace of the world.¹⁸

British Troops in Indonesia. Defeated on Greece, the Ukrainian delegate at once charged, on February 7, 1946, that the British troops in Indonesia had been used for political ends. He quoted a protest of the London Daily Mail against the use of Japanese troops as order-keepers in Indonesia and alleged heavy slaughter of the natives by British heavy weapons in an effort to repress Indonesian nationalism.

To all this Bevin replied that the job of restoring order to Indonesia had been given to Britain by the Allies, that the British had been fired on first and that after the British Commander, General Mallaby, had been assassinated it had been difficult to prevent excesses. The British had been forced to use the hostage system. He denounced as a “lie” the charge that “we ever attacked the Indonesian movement.”¹⁹ Again he was supported by the legal government, the Netherlands, which was naturally glad to have British troops do what it could not. Bevin was adamant against the Ukrainian proposal to send an investigating commission to Java to report on the facts. That would be an indignity against the British Government, since it would imply support of the Ukrainian charges.

Naturally it would be hard on British pride to be investigated. Yet it was an old established practice of the League of Nations to try to get the facts by means of a committee of investigation. The New York Times, on January 23, had held it to be the duty of the UN to appoint investigation commissions for all the situations complained about, including Indonesia, but Bevin would not hear of it and the Ukrainian resolution was defeated, on February 13, by a vote of 7 to 2.²⁰

Allied Troops in Syria-Lebanon. Western majorities were sufficient to vote down the charges of the angered Russians. But before the British delegation could draw its breath the representative of Lebanon charged, on February 14, that the presence of British and French troops in Syria and Lebanon constituted a dangerous “threat to the peace.” In the preceding cases the legal governments had defended the presence of British troops. Now Syria and Lebanon made it plain that the troops had not been invited and that they were not welcome. Independent nations, it was affirmed, should not have to bear the indignity of foreign troops on their soil. The Syrian delegate then related how in December 1945 Britain and France had agreed that their troops should remain in Syria and Lebanon indefinitely, and had so notified the natives. Could anyone deny, he challenged, that this was interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states?

Foreign Minister Bidault replied for France, that complications of this sort were a natural outgrowth of the war and that France and Britain were willing to negotiate for the removal of the troops. In the meantime the world should trust these two powers to produce a satisfactory settlement. Sir Alexander Cadogan, for Britain, concurred.

Then for two days delegates to the Security Council spoke, without dissent, to the effect that the British and French troops should be withdrawn at once. On February 16 the United States introduced a resolution which expressed confidence that the troops would be withdrawn at the earliest possible date and requested that the Council be kept informed on the status of the negotiations. The resolution was at first declared adopted, but Vishinsky reminded the Council that he had not voted for it, since it was not specific enough in directing the withdrawal of the offending troops.²¹

A Russian Veto. The Soviet Union had used its veto power for the first time and in a case in which its vital interests were not threatened. Britain and France announced at once that they would carry out the resolutions favored by the majority anyway, and the case was dropped from the agenda. The Western world then resounded with denunciations of the Russians for maliciously blocking the pacific processes of the Council. The Russians, reacting partly against the idea that UN was created to protect the small states against Russia, had instead used UN as a forum for prosecuting the Western powers.

Iran

Moreover, they still maintained their position in Iran. After heated debate the Council had kept the Iran question on its agenda, on January 30, pending direct negotiations. The Soviets denied all allegations of interference in Iran’s affairs. On March 6 the State Department announced that it had dispatched a note to the Kremlin calling for complete withdrawal of Russian forces in Iran, requesting a prompt reply. On the 25th the Security Council reconvened in New York City and at once took up the Iran dispute, Gromyko opposing all consideration of the case. He found some support from Dr. Najera, of Mexico, who was not convinced that international peace and security was threatened. However, all members except Russia and Poland soon agreed that the case should be put on the agenda for discussion.

This was a fundamental decision, since it involved the right of a small state to present its case to the Council. If that could not be done the UN would be of small value in restraining aggression.

Gromyko then asked for further postponement until April 10, pending further negotiations. In late January a new Prime Minister had been elected in the Iranian Parliament, by a vote of 52 to 51. Ahmed Quavam succeeded Hakimi and at once began negotiations with the Russians. It was clear that the Russians hoped that under further pressure he would accept their terms by April 10.

Postponement until this date being rejected, Gromyko walked out of the Council, on March 27, refusing to participate in its sessions on the case. The Council then relaxed and amid some levity heard Hussein Ala, the Iranian representative, elaborate his charges.

On April 2 the Iranian Government sent a message saying that Soviet armed forces were still interfering in its affairs and that the negotiations had yielded no positive results. The next day the Soviet Government telegraphed that an agreement had been reached and that the troops would be withdrawn within six weeks. Therefore, on April 4, Byrnes moved that proceedings be deferred until May 6, at which time both governments would be asked to report “whether the withdrawal of the Soviet troops had been completed.”

On April 15, 1946, the Government of Iran informed the Council that it wished to withdraw the case, but the American and British delegates held that duress seemed to be involved. On May 21 Iran notified the Council that the Soviet troops had been withdrawn as of May 6, but this too was not considered sufficient evidence for dropping the case. Then, on May 29, Hussein Ala received orders from his Government to say no more about the dispute and there was no further consideration thereafter, though the case was not formally closed.²²

Russia Contained. An agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union had been signed giving the Russians an oil concession in North Iran on a 51 to 49 division of the profits, a basis highly embarrassing to the British who turned over to Iran only about 20 per cent of their oil gains. The agreement was, however, conditional, since the Iranian Parliament had passed a law forbidding the giving of any oil concessions while foreign troops remained in Iran. All that Quavam could do accordingly was to promise to bring the Russian oil concession before Parliament for ratification. When he did so it was rejected, over his protest, on October 22, 1947, and he resigned, on December 10. The pro-British Hakimi became Prime Minister again.

Lacking confidence in the strength of the Iranian army, Quavam had not ventured to send troops against Azerbaijan until December 1946. Then the Russian-sponsored government collapsed, though the province did succeed in retaining somewhat more autonomy than before.

In May 1947 American Brigadier General Schwartzkopf, head of the Iranian gendarmerie, came to the United States to secure equipment for his force and for the army of Iran. In June Iran was given $25,000,000 worth of military supplies on credit, but no heavy weapons.²³

Russia had been defeated, temporarily at least, all along the line. She was forced to withdraw from Iran and she got no oil.

After March 2, 1946, the date before which she had agreed to withdraw her troops, she was legally in the wrong. It was upon this point that Secretary Byrnes kept attention focused throughout the dispute. He went to New York to conduct the case himself and did so with complete firmness. A real victory for the position of small nations in the United nations was won.

Russia was also “contained,” forced back even, in a region where her interests were vital and where she felt them to be urgent. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that foreign observers were almost unanimous in agreeing that the Russians could not understand: (a) that the point of legality justified the expulsion of Russian troops from Iran while British and the American troops remained in a dozen far-flung places over the world; (b) why Russia could have no oil in Iran while the British and Americans did; and (c) why the Security Council should be used to embarrass the Soviet Union before the world.²⁴ On May 6, as the Iran case ebbed, Pravda attacked the British-American policy “in the bluntest and most smashing criticism of that program” that had appeared in the Soviet press.²⁵

In the United States there was general agreement that Russia’s tactics had been provocative and offensive to the other members of the Council. She had: (a) denied its right to deal with the controversy and Iran’s right to be heard; (b) insisted on postponement and walked out when it was not granted; (c) put the severest diplomatic pressure on Iran and then argued that the Council was denying Iran’s sovereignty when it refused to drop the case; and (d) kept troops in Iran beyond the deadline and then failed to report to the Council when they were out. The impression made upon the British New Statesman and Nation was “not that of a Machiavellian Power pursuing a calculated course of aggrandizement, but rather of a blundering and suspicious giant, throwing its weight around and hurting itself and everyone else.”

Impasse. In the Security Council there was considerable sympathy for Soviet objectives in Iran. It was understood that war damage had reduced Russia’s oil output by 5,000,000 tons annually and that Soviet officials were deeply worried about the future, building synthetic oil plants and urging conservation. It was appreciated also that Moscow had reason for being concerned about the internal situation in Iran, which lay only an hour’s flight from the Baku region—Russia’s jugular vein—notoriously corrupt, long under British influence and now submitting its army and police to American training. The United States had become very agitated when conditions were bad in Mexico and would become more so if the Russians monopolized the oil concessions there, backed by a ring of air bases below Mexico.²⁶

There was real tragedy in the situation, or so it seemed to me after observing most of the Security Council sessions. On the merits of the case there was much to be said for Russia’s concern about Azerbaijan. Yet the merits were never presented or considered. All of the controversy turned on points of procedure. Here the Russians either were wrong, or they put themselves there. The whole affair humiliated and embittered them and created a permanent grievance. There could be no doubt that they would await a favorable day for ending Anglo-American dominance in Iran, and the Middle East, especially since “a large section” of the American press continued to breathe “continuous hatred and threats of war” against Russia.²⁷

On the other hand, Byrnes had tried to negotiate the issue in Moscow and had been rebuffed. Iran had a right to appeal to UN and it was essential that she be heard. Russia’s conduct was illegal and it was difficult to see any alternative except to oppose it and insist upon the right of the Security Council to consider the case.

Yet there was no legal way for Russia to gain any of her objectives in Iran. The great landlords in the Iranian parliament would never willingly grant an oil concession to Russia, since that would bring Communist influence into the zone of the concession. They had good reason to believe also that the Russians would not be satisfied with less than real control of the region concerned, as well as of Azerbaijan. They were certain therefore to keep the Russians out and to rely on the British and Americans to back them. The Westerners might exploit Iran’s resources on less favorable terms, but they would leave the landlords in control of Iran, especially since the latter were supported by American arms and military instructors.

Their rule could only be preserved by British and American support. The correspondent of the Chicago Daily News telegraphed that the leftist Tudeh party, allegedly Russian inspired, was the only strong political group in Iran.

He had talked with many of its leaders, mostly professional people, and found them full of love for their wretched country and fed up with British domination, a sentiment in which the Iranian workers fully joined. They wanted a government “friendly” to Russia both in Tabriz and Teheran.²⁸

One thing was certain. The long series of public fights in the Security Council from January to May 1946, touched off by Iran’s appeal, left the three Great Powers embittered and estranged. Russia had been stopped, and the formal authority of UN upheld, but no way had been found for UN to tackle the basic problems in Iran, its dangerous social unrest, and the clash of Britain and Russia for oil and control. In his address to the Overseas Press Club in New York, early in March, Byrnes had opposed “unilateral gnawing away at the status quo” and disclaimed that it was sacrosanct anywhere. It was “not in our tradition to defend the dead hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege.” Our diplomacy “must not be negative and inert,” but “marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, practical and forward looking suggestions.”

This was eminently sound doctrine, and it is to be regretted that some way was not found to apply it to Iran.

We Stop Russia. Instead, Secretary Byrnes felt compelled by Russia’s acts and by the American-British pressures upon him to concentrate all his energies on forcing Russian troops out of Iran. In the process the United States became the leader of a stop-Russia coalition.

A turning-point came in early 1946, when very heavy pressure was concentrated on Secretary Byrnes from three directions, the President, the Congress and the British Government. Lord Vansittart cried out angrily that to pursue the mediator’s role was “self righteous abstention” and when Byrnes changed his course sharply Vansittart commented that he had “evolved into a statesman.” Byrnes was much more popular in Washington also when he became the tough prosecutor of the Soviet Union.²⁹

During all these months the British Labor Government followed the Churchill policy toward Russia without the slightest deviation. It was not until after the United States had also accepted it and moved out in front that cautionary British voices began to be heard. Late in May Field-Marshal Smuts, elder statesman and Premier of South Africa, made a speech in London advocating that the British Commonwealth group should assume the mediator’s role between the two behemoths, interpreting one to the other and thus preventing war. This would surely accord with the interests of the British Dominions, whose greatest interest is to avoid another war.

By this time a great British leader could aspire to take up the mediator’s role, but the United States could hardly regain that strategic situation.

Churchill’s Fulton Speech

Stalin’s February Address. On February 9, 1946, Premier Stalin made a speech which stirred fears in some quarters. He opened with the Marxist explanation of world wars, monopoly capitalism fighting for markets and raw materials. He did distinguish sharply between the two world wars, the latter having become an anti-fascist people’s war, during which the Soviet social system had shown itself the best and strongest. It had survived because the Communist Party had reversed the usual development and built heavy industries first. Now the fundamental task was to restore the devastated areas, to increase goods for mass consumption, to surpass the world in scientific achievements and to organize “a new mighty upsurge of national economy.” Three or four five-year plans might be necessary to raise production to, among other things, 60,000,000 tons of steel annually.

This figure was at once said to be ominous, since it was coupled with Stalin’s warm praise of the Red Army, but any belligerent intent in his speech had to be deduced by implication and by somewhat strained interpretation.³⁰

Preliminary Conference. The same could hardly be said of Winston Churchill’s famous speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri—in President Truman’s home state—on March 5, 1946. During several weeks spent in Florida he carefully matured his blast, after flying to Washington on February 10 for a conference with President Truman which was reported to concern his speech.³¹ That the content of the speech was discussed hardly admits of doubt, since it was to be a world-shaking event.

As the momentous day approached, Churchill returned from Florida to Washington and the President journeyed with him to Fulton to present him to his audience and to bless the occasion. As Churchill said in opening his speech: “The President has travelled a thousand miles to dignify and magnify our meeting here today

The Address. The urgency of the occasion was soon evident. In the grand prose cadences which had thrilled so many millions of Americans during the war, Churchill declared that “Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the aftertime.” Constancy of mind was essential and persistency of purpose.

What for? “Our over-all strategic concept” was to protect the myriad cottages or apartment homes of the wage earners “from the two gaunt marauders—war and tyranny.” The Missouri folk had not been conscious that these two monsters were about to attack them until Churchill described “the frightful disturbance in which the ordinary family is plunged when the curse of war swoops down upon the bread-winner and those for whom he works and contrives.”

It was evident that the situation was serious, for Churchill went on to urge that the UN “must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force” and a certain number of air squadrons. He asserted that it would be “criminal madness” to cast the atomic bomb adrift “in this still agitated and ununited world.” No one would be able to sleep so soundly if some Communist, or Neo-Fascist state had invented the bomb. God had willed that this should not be.

Then he came to the second danger which threatened “the cottage home,” tyranny, the “police governments” of Eastern Europe. It was “not our duty at this time, when difficulties are so numerous, to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries whom we have not conquered in war,” but we must “never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom. . . .”

The inference was clear that we could not go to war to drive the Communists out of Eastern Europe at this time, but we must keep the matter in mind and we must keep on insisting that “the people of any country have the right and should have the power” to exercise all the rights of Englishmen and to enjoy all of the governmental processes and freedoms of the Anglo-Saxon world, which Churchill enumerated in full.

Then “at this sad and breathless moment” he came to “the crux of what I have travelled here to say”—no prevention of war or successful UN without an alliance of the English-speaking peoples, continuance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint use of all naval and air force bases all over the world, doubling our mobility.

Otherwise, “The Dark Ages may return, the Stone Age.” “Beware, I say: Time may be short. Do not let us take the course of letting events drift along it is too late.” A shadow had fallen. Nobody knew “what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the future, or what are the limits if any to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies.” From Stettin to Trieste there was “an iron curtain.” He saw enormous and wrongful inroads into Germany.

Turkey and Persia were profoundly alarmed. And in front of the iron curtain “Communist Fifth Columns” were everywhere, “a growing challenge and peril to civilization.” In the Far East there was anxiety, especially in Manchuria.

Having built up this picture of a terrible juggernaut operating all over the world which had to be tamed, Churchill then repulsed “the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent.” He did not believe that Russia desired war, only “the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.” Therefore “while time remains” he demanded he “establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.” Since nothing except overwhelming force could rapidly eliminate communism from East Europe and Russia herself, he did not explain how this was to be done.

In the meantime, what was needed was a “settlement and the longer that is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become” (i.e. our atomic monopoly would disappear). Therefore no balance of power, no working “on narrow margins,” no “quivering precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure.” What was needed was a great preponderance of power against Russia.

Then he drew on the great prestige which he had won before 1939. The last time he “saw it all coming and cried aloud,” but “no one paid any attention.” Surely we “must not let that happen again.” There must be “a good understanding,” that is, a showdown, with Russia “now, in 1946.”

The old warrior and world strategist was off again, and with a terrifying start. He had waged war on the Reds in Russia to the limit of British tolerance during 1919 and 1920. Then throughout the twenties he had preached the menace of the Red revolution, never losing an opportunity to refer to the Bolshevik leaders “as murderers and ministers of hell.”³²

Forced to welcome their aid in 1941 to save Britain, he had incessantly attempted the impossible feat of using them to beat Germany while denying them the fruits of victory. Now he would mobilize the might of the United States to achieve what he had never been able to do before.

A Master Stroke. If, too, there is a Third World War, Churchill’s Missouri speech. Will be the primary document in explaining its origins. His was the first full-length picture of a Red Russia out to conquer the world. Backed by the immense authority of his war record, and by the charm of his great personality, it pre-conditioned many millions of listeners for a giant new cordon sanitaire around Russia, for a developing world crusade to smash world communism in the name of Anglo-Saxon democracy. In print Churchill’s battle cry became the bible of every warmonger in the world. It said all they had wanted to say and with his great name behind it, it could be used endlessly with great effect.

At Fulton, Churchill also prevailed over Roosevelt and Hull, the great American leaders who had checkmated him in all the later stages of the war, preventing him from creating a gulf between East and West. At Fulton he did it. Had Roosevelt lived, Churchill would never have dared to propose that he come to the United States and issue a call for a world alliance to encircle the Soviet Union and establish Western democracy in Eurasia. If he had ventured to make such a speech in the United States he would have been sharply disavowed. But with Roosevelt dead he was able not only to do that, but to carry President Truman along in his baggage.

Whether the idea of the speech originated with Churchill or Truman is not yet known. In the light of Truman’s strongly hardened determination to quit “babying” the Soviets, he was probably the originator. It seems a little odd that in his Memoirs there is only one casual reference to an event of such outstanding importance, one of the chief landmarks of the Cold War.³³

“A Block-Buster.” This could be because many found it difficult to recall a more provocative and inflammatory utterance by a Western democratic leader who had any reputation for responsibility. This was so evident at the time that it did not seem that Churchill’s speech would do great damage. The Memphis Commercial Appeal and the Newark Star Ledger welcomed it, but the New York Herald Tribune commented that Churchill had flung “a blockbuster into the disordered and tottering streets of the city of man.” The Washington Post noted that his international police was an “illogical appendage to a United Nations which is simply an association of nation states.”

The Boston Globe saw that Churchill invited the United States “to become the heir to the evils of collapsing colonialism, and inevitably their defender, all the way from North Africa to the China Sea.” The Chicago Sun understood that Churchill was fighting for his world, one which no longer existed in reality and could never be reconstituted. “To follow the standard raised by this great but blinded aristocrat would be to march to the world’s most ghastly war,” added the Sun. “Let Mr. Truman’s rejection of the poisonous doctrines declared by Mr. Churchill be prompt and emphatic.”³⁴

This, of course, was impossible. Truman had not only travelled far to “dignify and magnify” the meeting. He had applauded during the address, when his applause “could have been omitted without damage to either protocol or country.”³⁵ Later Truman denied that he had seen a copy of the speech in advance, after an aide of Churchill’s had announced that he had, but when a reporter gave him an opportunity to disavow the address he refused to comment on it. The President talked as if it had been just an ordinary case of free speech.³⁶

Some Official Disclaimers. Secretary Byrnes was more forthright. He declared to his press conference that he had not been consulted about the Churchill speech. Asked whether the United States associated itself with the address he replied that the United States had nothing to do with it.³⁷ Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson also found it impossible to attend the dinner for Churchill in New York on March 15. After being scheduled to speak in Byrnes’ place as the representative of the nation in the welcoming ceremonies at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, Acheson abruptly cancelled the engagement. Urgent matters had come up which made it impossible for him to attend.³⁸ The British Labor Government also stated formally that “the policy of His Majesty’s Government . . . is to be found only in the statements of His Majesty’s ministers. . . . His Majesty’s Government had no previous knowledge of the content of the speech.”³⁹

These were steps in the right direction, but the impropriety which the President had committed in going so far to listen to a long attack on a recent ally could not be repaired, or the damage to our foreign relations remedied. It was Truman’s presence on the Fulton platform which electrified the Russians, putting them on notice that Churchill spoke for both the United States and Britain.

Consequences. As Grafton pointed out, the effect of the Churchill-Truman performance would be to call forth more Russian expansionism, more Russian offense or more dynamic defense. In Churchill’s swirling proposals that America and Britain combine all their armed forces against Russia he had put Russia’s nightmare into words. She would have full license to believe that she was encircled, with the world actively discussing mobilization against her. Vet our whole tradition required that we continue to work for settlements based on sense and accommodation “and not on these apocalyptic world visions.”⁴⁰

Lippmann’s analysis pointed out that Churchill had stated all the reasons why the proposed Anglo-American combination would reinforce Britain’s position in its threatened imperial parts, but “a united front in the region of empire will weaken, not strengthen, the western world in the contest of influence with the Soviet Union.” We would lose our identity and our influence in Asia by merging ourselves with the British Empire.⁴¹

In Washington the Churchill speech suited many Congressmen exactly, but Senators Pepper, of Florida, Kilgore, of West Virginia, and Taylor, of Idaho, issued a joint statement saying that the Churchill program would cut the throat of the UN and destroy the unity of the Big Three, without which the war could not have been won and without which the peace could not be saved. They found it “shocking to see Mr. Churchill, who rose to power on the repudiation of Chamberlain, align himself with the old Chamberlain Tories who strengthened the Nazis as part of their anti-Soviet crusade.”⁴²

An Impropriety. Arthur Krock summed up majority opinion around the State Department and the Capitol as unfavorable to Churchill, for these reasons: (1) he should not have made his proposal in the United States; (2) he should not have made it in the presence of President Truman; (3) he should not have made it “at this critical stage of inter-Allied relations”; (4) it was bound to have a destructive effect on the United Nations; and (5) to have the opposite effect intended.⁴³

Impact on American Public Opinion. The first four conclusions were obvious and the fifth should have followed, but it did not. A first poll of public opinion showed that of those who had heard of Churchill’s proposal 40 per cent opposed the idea altogether, and only 18 per cent approved it, yet another poll a month later showed 85 per cent approving the idea.⁴⁴

Allowing for the fallibility of the polls, the effect of the Churchill-Truman initiative was bound to be cumulative. All peoples are highly susceptible to leadership and with each new friction between the Anglo-American team and Russia a certain number of irritated people would conclude that Churchill was right. There was no living with these Russians.

This was the more certain since Churchill had made an open, clamant appeal to fear. He had pulled out all the stops in suggesting that “the Soviet system, alien, secretive, harsh, implacable, could scarcely exist in the same world with the Western democracies.”⁴⁵ He had done his best to stir alarm in every cottage and in every workman’s mind, and to stimulate fear of this insatiable power which would destroy them unless something very drastic was done at once.

Anne O’Hare McCormick had this in mind in her commentary. She observed that “it is inconceivable that a leader as shrewd and foresighted as Stalin would draw a people yearning for peace into a new war,” after the deluge of war just suffered, which had “battered Russia more than her Allies.” This was the assumption upon which a firm policy must be firmly based. “At the apex of our power American policy cannot be based on fear.”⁴⁶

The London Times expressed the same sensible idea on the same day when it observed that “It would be an assumption of despair” to hold that Western democracy and communism “are doomed to a fatal contest.”

This was severe condemnation from highly responsible sources. In a difficult time of post-war adjustment to new power relationships Churchill had appealed to a most improbable fear and preached a counsel of despair. Truman had aided and abetted him, to say the least.

Effects in Russia. The effect upon the minds of the Russians was deep and lasting. Pravda labelled its editorial “Churchill Rattles the Sword.” It compared him to Goebbels and noted that it was very characteristic that he spoke not in England, where he had been defeated for re-election in a campaign stressing the “Red danger,” but in the U.S.A. In an interview Stalin labelled Churchill’s speech as a dangerous act, one calculated to sow dissension. Churchill now took his stand with the warmongers. Like Hitler, said Stalin, he “also begins the work of unleashing a new war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are full fledged nations, who are called upon to decide the fortunes of the entire world.”⁴⁷

Brooks Atkinson wrote from Moscow describing “the outburst of fury” which Churchill’s speech had loosed. It had enormously raised the pitch of political feeling in Russia. The Russian people were kept aware generally of threats to their security, but here was something specific. Like all other peoples, the Russians did not want war. “They have had a bellyful of carnage. They have not had time enough yet to recover from the deep poignant suffering of the fierce war years, when they lost more lives than both the British and Americans.” They would therefore be slow to believe in the possibility of war again, without a bombshell such as Churchill’s speech. It “had the effect of electrifying and depressing everyone” and it fell squarely into the familiar pattern of Soviet beliefs—capitalistic hostility, encirclement and the violent imperialism of a dying capitalist economy leading to war—this time against the Soviet Union.⁴⁸

In other words, few things could have convinced the Russian people of the reality of great danger ahead so effectively as Churchill’s speech did. He could and did do it better and more easily than any other living person, binding the Soviet peoples to their leaders as nothing else could.

In one day Churchill had also insulted and labelled as a monstrous danger to the peace the 200,000,000 people of the Soviet Union, who had suffered unutterably as Britain’s ally and who believed that, to use Atkinson’s phrase, “Soviet Russia represents a force for world peace.” After he had returned to the United States Atkinson revealed that when the report of Churchill’s speech was given out in Russia, with simultaneous political comment, “Moscow received it hysterically, as if the atomic bombs might start dropping before midnight.”⁴⁹

Results in Germany. Churchill’s speech also encouraged the Germans to redouble their propaganda efforts to split the victors by spreading anti-Russian stories among the United States troops in Germany. C. L. Sulzberger telegraphed on March 10 that this campaign “accelerated immediately” upon the publication of Churchill’s speech. However, one American garrison commander did issue a sharp order reminding his troops that the Soviet Union was an ally, that millions of Russians had died in the Allied cause and that American tolerance of German frauleins’ anti-Russian opinions was leading to trouble.

Churchill’s speech had given the embittered Germans full right to believe that they could successfully divide the Allies and recover their own might in a new and greater war of revenge upon the Russians, who had balked all their plans for world conquest.

Our Firm But Moderate Policy of Making Peace Condemned. The extent of the push which Churchill gave toward irreconcilable conflict stands out sharply by comparing his speech with those of Byrnes and Vandenberg a few days before. Reporting on the London UN sessions Vandenberg filled four columns with praise of UN, listing the credit items on the ledger of the London meetings. Then he asked “What is Russia up to now?” He named the places all around the world where she was pressing for advantage, and asserted his belief that the two great rival ideologies could “live together in reasonable harmony if the United States speaks as plainly upon all occasions as Russia does; if the United States just as vigorously sustains its own purposes as Russia does. . . .” The situation called for “patience and good will but not for vacillation.”

Vandenberg agreed with the new Ambassador designate to Russia, Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith, that “It is imperative that our national temperatures remain normal,” that “both nations want nothing so much as peace and security” and that “the best way to win Soviet respect and confidence” was to say only what we mean and mean every word we say.⁵⁰

On February 28 Byrnes made a speech which also indicated a tougher line toward Russia. Still he stressed that there had always been ideological differences in the world, and that “in this world there is room for many people with varying views and many governments with varying systems.” The United States wished “to maintain friendly relations with all nations and exclusive arrangements with no nation.” “We will gang up against no state,” Byrnes declared. “We will do nothing to break the world into exclusive blocs or spheres of influence.” Only an “inexcusable tragedy of errors could cause serious conflict between this country and Russia.”⁵¹

This was the policy which Byrnes and Vandenberg had enunciated a few days before Churchill spoke. Neither had given the slightest indication of belief that an irreconcilable conflict existed, or that Russia had to be hemmed in and overawed with overwhelming power. Neither had suggested that democracy had to be enforced everywhere. Both had given every indication that they expected to make peace, though with difficulty.

It was this sensible attitude which Churchill contradicted completely. He taught that all civilization was in imminent peril of destruction by Russia. The time was terribly short and our lives and fortunes could be saved only by a swift mobilization of overwhelming power against her. He desired to gang up with a vengeance.

Toughness Prescribed. It was this policy which, backed by President Truman, prevailed. Byrnes had already felt strong presidential disapproval for the agreements with Russia which he had made at Moscow. Truman had been influenced by his military and Congressional advisers, Admiral William D. Leaker Senators Connally and Vandenberg, all of whom thought Byrnes had not been tough enough. This was the view of British Foreign Secretary Bevin, who had “rather openly accused him of weakness and appeasement.”⁵² Now after the supreme demand for toughness at Fulton our policy steadily hardened. Churchill’s speech “marked the critical point where relations between the West and the East turned for the worse.”⁵³

Churchill’s European Campaign. After an elaborate reception by the élite of New York City and two further speeches in pursuit of his aim, Churchill returned to Europe. Soon he was waging a campaign for a United Europe, as a means of pushing Russia out of Eastern Europe. At the University of Zurich, Switzerland, on September 19, 1946, he bewailed the tragedy of Europe, saying “that is all that the Germanic races have got by tearing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide.” This hint that the Nazis might not have been so far wrong was followed by an appeal to France and Germany to establish “a partnership.” He gave warning that “time may be short.” At present there might be a breathing space while “we dwell strangely and precariously under the shield, and I will even say protection, of the atomic bomb.” If “at first” all the European states were not able or willing to join, those who could must do so at once. The implication was clear that the states of East Europe would be brought in eventually.⁵⁴

This was made absolutely plain in his address on May 14, 1947, in which he said that “Our aim is to bring about the unity of all nations of all Europe.” He explained that “The whole purpose of a united democratic Europe is to give decisive guarantees against aggression.” He did not say who would defend the Soviet Union or the rest of the world against the might of a United Europe, with nearly 400,000,000 people and plenty of war-making tradition and power.⁵⁵

Moderation Advised. The démarche at Fulton, Missouri, launched the United States openly upon a policy of dealing with Russia as an incorrigible menace. On March 10, Cordell Hull revealed his deep alarm over the turn in events. We who are living, he said, must not allow the human race to commit suicide through selfishness, impatience and provocation. Addressing all the members of the United Nations, Hull offered a five-point program for overcoming what he termed the spirit of impatience. He urged each government to: (1) examine with sympathy and patience the views of others; (2) ascertain the true facts; (3) avoid the assumption of adamant positions; (4) refrain from exaggerating and over-emphasizing one’s own claims; and (5) refrain from making an appeal to prejudice.⁵⁶

This was the voice of true statesmanship. Of course it needed to be heard in Moscow. Yet the voice of reason and moderation, of firmness and patience, could no longer have much effect in the West. There the implacable Truman-Churchill spirit had seized control. It was their policy of alliance against Russia and restraining communism by military means which was to rule for many a day—until its bankruptcy was demonstrated, as it would be, or another global war came.

The greatest danger was that we might get both the failure of this policy and the war. Yet there was a restraining factor which might compel us to turn our policies into less belligerent and more constructive channels. President Benes of Czechoslovakia stated it on March 9, 1946, four days after Churchill spoke. “There will be difficulties,” said Benes, “but there won’t be war. There can be no world war today which would not be followed by revolution—greater revolution than has taken place this time. Undoubtedly there are people who would like to see war between the East and the West, but the revolution which would follow such a contest would defeat the very ends for which they wished it.”⁵⁷

Walter Lippmann also foresaw, on March 15, that neither Russia nor the United States could conquer the other, but that they could become entangled in a war which would “go on and on as a terrible mixture of civil war, famine, annihilation and extermination at long range, which no one could have any plan for stopping.” Two months later, after a trip through Europe, he thought that the peoples of Europe could not be mobilized for such a war and if it did break out “the Continent would be plunged into the anarchy of a gigantic civil war, amidst which the great non-European powers would never know who was friend and who was foe.”⁵⁸

Atomic Ultimatum. The practical certainty that such a war could not be ended did not deter some Americans from wanting to starlit. Thus George H. Earle, former American Minister to Bulgaria, returned to make “America realize what a frightful menace we have in Russia.” It was “the greatest danger that ever threatened America.” Civilization’s outlook was “the blackest in history.” He urged that Russia be given an ultimatum to “get back to her own territory and if they refused I would use the atomic bomb on them while we have it and before they get it.” He asserted that “If Russia had the atomic bomb there would be few Americans alive today.”⁵⁹

The Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris

First Session

It was in the deeply envenomed atmosphere left by Churchill’s indictment of Russia as a world menace which had to be quarantined by overwhelming force that the Foreign Ministers met again in Paris, on April 25, 1946. This time Molotov quickly agreed that the French should sit in on all sessions, but as Byrnes recorded, this “marked about the limit of his concessions.”

The Iran case rankled deeply and led to Russian charges of American imperialist expansion. Vishinsky alleged that we sought bases in Turkey and Iran, little knowing perhaps how soon we would have them. Byrnes assured him that it was our policy to get all troops removed “from countries other than Germany and Japan at the earliest possible moment.” The Russians, however, were in no mood to take their troops home. Molotov rejected the American draft of a treaty for Germany as wholly inadequate, and refused even to discuss Austria. There was no agreement about the disposal of Italy’s colonies, though France and Britain vetoed some solutions, and deadlock over the Dodecanese Islands and Trieste developed. Though there was agreement on many minor points, on the main issues “Molotov was adamant. He was evidently determined to delay the withdrawal of his occupation armies.”⁶⁰

No reaction to the Churchill Doctrine could have been predicted more certainly.

A Twenty-five Year Treaty Proposed. Russia had cooled even on the idea of a twenty-five-year treaty to keep Germany disarmed. This device for reassuring Russia about her security, and for getting Russian troops out of Europe, had been proposed first by Senator Vandenberg in January 1945.⁶¹ In December 1945 Byrnes had discussed the idea with Stalin, who had said that if the United States proposed such a treaty he would support it.⁶² But in April 1946 Molotov would have nothing to do with it. To most Americans it seemed a very generous offer. The New York Times even headlined it as a “Daring Venture.” But in February, after the heated UN sessions of January, Molotov made no reply when a draft of the proposed treaty was forwarded to him, and when Byrnes raised the matter in Paris Molotov was not interested. It is difficult to believe that the Russians would have accepted the treaty, since they could hardly expect to establish new and friendly governments, by their definition, in East Europe in a short time, and until they were sure they would wish to keep their troops close at hand. If, however, any chance of their accepting a paper guarantee had existed it vanished with Churchill’s speech, which put confidence only in superior armed force. Behind Secretary Byrnes’ offer the Russians were too likely to see President Truman sitting on the platform at Fulton applauding Churchill.

Secretary Byrnes’ report to the nation on the May meeting in Paris explained in moderate terms his position on the twenty-five-year treaty, Trieste, Italian reparations and other subjects. It plainly put the onus on the Russians for blocking the calling of the peace conference and threatened that if no agreement for its convocation were reached at the forthcoming session of the Big Four in Paris, beginning on June 15, the United Nations General Assembly would be asked to make recommendations about the peace settlements.⁶³

On May 27 Molotov replied, insisting on the necessity for great power unanimity, alleging that a new method of pressure, threats and intimidation was being used and denying that the United Nations had any jurisdiction in the making of the treaties. He charged that the Americans and British acted together on all questions and said the proposed twenty-five-year treaty had been advanced “in the spirit of the notorious proposal of Senator Vandenberg.” He maintained that at Moscow Stalin had assented to the idea of a mutual assistance treaty against German aggression. As proposed later the Byrnes treaty was nothing of the sort, but a proposal to enforce the future disarmament of Germany, before she was disarmed.⁶⁴

From a comparison of the two statements it is obvious that both men believed they were right on the main issues. Each made a good case for his side, for example, on the subject of Italian reparations.

Bi-Partisan Accord. The deadlock in Paris produced perfect accord between Byrnes and the two Senators, Vandenberg and Connally, who had been with him at every important session in Paris. They had evinced their displeasure at the concessions made at Moscow in December and a serious split had threatened after the sessions in London, but now that Byrnes was making no concessions complete solidarity was restored. Vandenberg was so pleased that he refrained from making a full-length speech in the Senate. Hailing the advent of “a positive, constructive, peace-seeking, bi-partisan foreign policy for the United States,” Vandenberg was “willing to let the record stand” where Byrnes had left it in his radio speech.⁶⁵

By this time the bi-partisan approach, which Roosevelt and Hull had developed to carry the United States into the United Nations, had led to the capture of both the State Department and the White House by the bi-partisan combine. In it, too, it was the voice of Vandenberg, the representative of the minority, which was controlling. The attitude of the Executive toward Russia had to be stem enough to satisfy him.

Two Postulates. Questioning whether Byrnes was altogether wise in promptly replying to Molotov’s Pravda statement, the New York Herald Tribune thought that some postulates would have to be accepted if the differences were to be bridged in even passable fashion. It suggested two, the first being that the Russian attitude is as sincerely held as our own. The Russians put “quite as passionate a conviction” behind their use of words like democracy and freedom as we did. Their fears of our system were “doubtless as genuine and quite as well based” as the fears which we entertain of them, for the two systems were almost completely antithetical and each tended to undermine and destroy the other, unless an effective truce could be established.

The second postulate was “that no power possesses a monopoly of either wisdom or virtue, especially in Germany, where all were pursuing uncertain, self-contradictory policies and where no power was sufficiently disinterested or “right” to be entitled to dictate the solution.⁶⁶

This attitude contrasted with that of Henry Luce’s Life magazine, which published full-page advertisements declaring that Russia and the West “never will agree” around a table. A two-inch headline asked “Why Kid Around?” There was no misunderstanding, but there was a world power conflict, which had to be fought hard and sleeplessly.⁶⁷

Arming Latin America. As one means of prosecuting this struggle President Truman proposed to the Congress, on May 7, 1946, a program for arming the Western Hemisphere. If the world was to be partitioned into zones we would fortify ours. Three years later a lifelong student of Latin American affairs recorded the results in Latin American domestic politics. Peru bought $6,000,000 worth of U.S. arms and in a few weeks its government was overthrown. Venezuela imported a million dollars worth of arms and its government was tossed out shortly afterwards. In both cases unusually democratic governments were ousted.⁶⁸ Latin American military cliques, already prone to upset governments, were feeling strong enough to suppress even the most democratically elected and supported ones.

Both in East Europe and in Latin America the military security of the giant powers was bad for free elections in the small states. Our armament of Latin America, under the guise of preventing the Russians from taking over the continent, was to go on until eight governments were overthrown by military upstarts and a visiting Vice-President of the United States and his wife were stoned and spat upon in 1958.

Attitudes Toward Fascism. The difference in attitudes between Russia and the West was brought out strikingly in connection with the effort of the Security Council to take some action against the fascist government of Spain.

The Council was working toward a diplomatic quarantine of the Franco Govemment, as a potential threat to peace, against the opposition of the British and American Governments. They argued that the step would help Franco more than it would hurt him. In Moscow Brooks Atkinson found that to the Russians the continued existence of the Franco regime was “a concrete, recognizable and immediate threat to peace.” Although Americans might now have a weary attitude toward fascism “the Russians retain the hatred and physical revulsion to fascism that they possessed during the war.”

To them fascism was a living evil, “almost a physical presence that they have no difficulty in reconstructing from the ashes of graves, burned villages and millions of terrible personal experiences.” We might take a more detached attitude but they regarded it as a perversion of logic to leave fascism in power anywhere, after so much of the world’s life strength had been used to destroy fascism. He added that “after their success in stamping out fascism in the Balkans and Poland during the past year” the Russians were not likely to have much respect for legalistic distinctions invented for Franco’s benefit.⁶⁹

In the United States the idea of using Franco Spain as a military base against Russia was not yet openly expressed, but the proposal to use a united Germany as a bulwark against Russia was finding important public support, as if that idea had never had a very thorough tryout under Hitler.⁷⁰

The Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris

Second Session

When the Council of Foreign Ministers met again in Paris, in mid-June, 1946, deadlock again ensued until on June 27 Molotov suddenly began to make concessions. He agreed that the Dodecanese Islands should go to Greece. Then he accepted the American proposal to postpone decision on the Italian colonies for a year, with reference to the General Assembly if agreement could not be reached. These concessions amounted to a renunciation, for the time being at least, of Russia’s desire for a foothold in the Mediterranean.

Italian Reparations. On July 4 Molotov accepted July 29 as the date for the opening of the peace conference and then, after six hours of debate, the Anglo-Americans finally accepted the Soviet demand for $100,000,000 reparations from Italy, to be made up from surplus Italian industrial equipment, Italian assets in the Balkans and the balance from current Italian production, for which the Russians would supply the raw materials.

If this appeared to be a point for Molotov it was based on strong considerations. The Italians had sent several hundred thousand troops into Russia. They had helped to destroy Minsk, Kharkov and many other Russian cities. Even though Italy had changed sides it would be a bad precedent for her to escape reparations altogether. On the other hand, we had argued for months that we had already given Italy $900,000,000 worth of supplies and that we could not also pay reparations for her. This was a strong argument. The final compromise required Italy to repair a little of the damage she had done in Russia by means which did not come in any important degree out of American aid.

Trieste. An accord was also reached on the general lines of a settlement for the troublesome Trieste issue. The French line through Venezia Gaulia was accepted as the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, and Trieste would be a free state, though much detail remained to be ironed out.

This, again, was as good a compromise as the power conflict would permit. On economic grounds the city should have gone to Yugoslavia. The majority of the people were Italians, but the city had absolutely no Italian hinterland. It was the best outlet to the Adriatic Sea for Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia. It is of vital importance to all of these states and of no commercial importance to Italy. All that the Italians can do in Trieste is to levy handling tribute on the commerce of the Danubian states, a situation which in normal circumstances would have deprived Italy of the port. It would have gone to Yugoslavia.

Yet it was of great strategic importance and given the power struggle the West had to hold it, if possible. Since its claim to do so was weak on economic grounds, the Free State solution was a fair compromise.

This settlement was achieved, said the New York Times, after strong pressure by Byrnes, who had been “diplomatically the aggressor in recent sessions to a degree that actually worried the anxious French.”⁷¹ French officials felt, with good reason, that the careful mediation of Premier-President Georges Bidault had saved the meeting from deadlock.

Agreement by Negotiation vs. Majority Votes. Yet another crisis quickly arose. Molotov wished to retain a veto over the procedure of the peace conference, not entirely without reason. The editor of the New York Herald Tribune, on July 8, 1946, thought that the Western powers—with their pressure for the conference, for “calling in world opinion,” for “broadening the debate—were asking for it.” From the beginning, the conference was “a little too obviously a device for summoning up a voting majority to carry issues against Russia which the Western powers could not settle directly.” If voting majorities in an international conference had “any real meaning or any true democratic basis” the case would be different. Since this was not true, said the editor, the Russian case was basically sound. Long face-to-face diplomatic battles were exhausting, but the results were “surer than the majority resolutions of conferences summoned to evade or override the real differences which exist.”

This is a basic consideration which is seldom considered in the West. We do not stop to think how we would feel if the Russians always wielded a heavy majority of votes against us.

Nevertheless, the procedural clash was compromised, for the time being at least, and the way cleared for the Paris peace conference to consider the treaties for the satellite states.

Tension Unavoidable. On July 7, Brooks Atkinson returned from a ten-months’ tour of duty in the Soviet Union for the New York Times and wrote three articles which, though partly an expression of the frustration which built up in all foreign correspondents in Moscow, contained a great deal of significant information and had an important effect upon our thinking.

Russia was governed by a dictatorship of thirteen men in the Politburo, who feared and repressed all internal opposition and regarded external opposition as equally hostile. The police regimentation of the people frightened him, but the Russian people did not seem to mind, since they had never known anything else. The Government was not imposed on the people against their will and they trusted their leaders. The Government was not corrupt. It did not put the interests of one group ahead of what it regarded as the true interests of the whole and the people had faith in it.

Atkinson explained the religious character of the Communist movement and its belief that the world was its province. The Soviet leaders did not want war. They knew more about its horrors than we did. They also did not want, at present, to defy world opinion, as their recent retreats on Iran and Turkey proved. Normal, intimate friendship was, however, not wanted. It was not possible. Though the Russian people were sincere and good-hearted we had “to live with the Russian nation in an atmosphere of bitterness and tension.” There was no other way.⁷²

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