In January 1948 the State Department published a book of documents captured in Germany under the title Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941.¹

This volume was a blow in the Cold War, issued apparently with two purposes: to suggest (a) that the German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, was the cause of the Second World War; and (b) that the Soviet Union was so avaricious that it over-reached itself with its partner in crime, Hitler, and largely justified the German attack on the Soviet Union. If these were not the purposes the publication was pointless, since no peaceful end could be served by issuing a book of German documents concerning negotiations with one of our greatest allies in the recent war.

That these were the objectives is verified by the reception which the publication had in the press. The New York Herald Tribune headlined its news story: “U.S. Reveals Documents of a Stalin-Hitler Pact to Divide Up the World.” The New York Times went further, saying: “Seized Nazi Papers Show Soviet Aims in 1939 to Grab Land and Divide Europe. Duplicity Traced. Secret Pact Clauses Set Control Spheres which Soviet Overstepped. Moscow Preferred Berlin to West.”

This is the impression which hundreds of newspaper articles and radio speakers gave to many millions of Americans, without ever suggesting that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the result of the long and dismal appeasement drive on the part of the West. Unfortunately, even the most intelligent of peoples can be conditioned for war by such means, unless time can be gained for a fuller examination of the issues and consequences at stake. In that event the judgment of Walter Lippmann, on February 12, 1948, will be upheld. Said Lippmann:

“This publication is a classic example of bad propaganda . . . bound to backfire, doing more injury to ourselves and to our friends than to the Russians against whom it was aimed. . . . That the State Department book was the work of propagandists and not of scholars is self-evident on the face of it. It contained only Nazi documents, and no self-respecting historian would dream of basing his judgment on the documents of only one side of a grave historical event. Moreover, only those Nazi documents were selected for publication which bore on Nazi-Soviet relations after April, 1939. . . . To embarrass our Western allies and ourselves by inviting the publication of documents for the period up to the Munich appeasement is not astute—indeed it is altogether incompetent—propaganda.”

As the Nuremberg documents state: “The view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of Lebensraum at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology.”² Hitler’s Mein Kampf had declared the relation of Germany to Russia to be “the most decisive concern of all German affairs.” National Socialism would “stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the East.” Instead of “the colonial and commercial policy of the past” there would be “the soil policy of the future” and “If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”³ Hitler was as explicit as he could be. He said publicly at Nuremberg on September 12, 1936: “If I had the Ural Mountains with their incalculable store of treasures in raw materials, Siberia, with its vast forests, and the Ukraine with its tremendous wheat fields, Germany and the National Socialist leadership would swim in plenty.”⁴

From the beginning the campaign of Nazism against Communism had been one of its chief selling points. Coupled with the often proclaimed Nazi lust for Russian resources it had convinced the controlling elements in the West that German Fascism would really dispose of Russian Communism. What the West had not been able to do in the great Interventions of 1918–20 would finally be achieved by a powerfully resurgent and rearmed Germany. That was one of the leading reasons why German rearmament was not only permitted but assisted by Western capitalists and politicians. At the very least a secure bulwark against communism would be erected. “The sturdy young Nazis of Germany are Europe’s guardians against the Communist danger,” said Lord Rothermere in the Daily Mail on November 18, 1933. “Once Germany has acquired the additional territory she needs in Western Russia, her need for expansion would be satisfied.”

This was the basic calculation upon which the whole giddy structure of appeasement was reared. Powerful people whose main concern was the preservation of their wealth and social position felt that playing ball with the Nazis was their best bet, especially since they dreaded deeply the social results of any war, even a “victorious” one. If the Nazis would only vent their dynamism in the East all would be well. It was with this hope and expectation that the decisive Bohemian bastion was presented to Hitler.

When this was accomplished at Munich there was for the moment nothing for the U.S.S.R. to do but wait and arm. Russian collaboration with the West had been sincere because based on real fear of Nazi Germany. Gustav Hilger, a high German diplomat who was a Russian specialist, and who spent the period of the Nazi-German truce in Moscow, writes that Moscow recognized the peril of the Nazi regime immediately, that Litvinov tried to be friendly with Hitler’s government at first and that he had the full support of the Kremlin in trying to work with the West through the League of Nations from 1934 to 1939. The stronger Hitler grew, the more Moscow labored for collective security, until the Munich conference convinced the Kremlin that the West was not only unwilling to oppose Hitler but not averse to German action against the Soviet Union.⁵

Soviet collaboration had been rejected at every point for five years, and resoundingly at Munich. It was still the best policy, but it was thinkable only if there was a political revulsion in the West which would bring in new governments sincerely desirous of alliance with Russia. A revulsion of sentiment occurred after March 1939, but it could not remove the appeasement governments, who could not and would not make a sincere alliance with Russia. They now feared and deeply distrusted Nazi Germany, after they had stubbornly surrendered their power to control or check her, but less than they feared Red Russia. Driven by public opinion, they had to do something, and the only thing they could think of was to try to intimidate Hitler with a paper guarantee of Poland. If this worked, well and good; if it did not Hitler would still be catapulted toward Russia.

The bluff failed, as it was certain to fail coming from the mouths of the appeasers, but its failure compelled the West to accept a state of war with Germany, which not only offended the explosive lord of Germany but forced him to execute his first rule, to clean up the West before attacking Russia. This maxim had been overlooked by the appeasers, along with an equally vital Nazi principle—never to be involved in a two-front war again. The Nazis accepted Foch’s dictum that Germany could never lose a one-front war or win a two-front war, and their military men were still more eager to live by it.

By the Spring of 1939 the stage had been set perfectly for the German-Soviet Pact of August 1939. The Russians needed to buy time, and they would have been superhuman if they had not been willing to get it by turning Hitler back upon the West, which had so steadfastly rejected all cooperation with them. But Germany needed a truce with Russia still more urgently—to avoid another two-front war. In mid-1939 it was as inevitable as anything can ever be in world politics that the two should come together.

The first move had been made in Berlin, on December 22, 1938, when Dr. Karl Schnurre, the German trade negotiator, offered to renew talks with Russia about a loan to be repaid in strategic raw materials. The Soviets reacted favorably on January 11, 1939, and Schnurre was on his way to Moscow when reports of his journey in the British and other newspapers caused Ribbentrop to recall him abruptly, “a slap in the face” which led the Russians to draw back for some six weeks.⁶

Warning From Moscow. Then after the credit negotiations had been resumed Stalin made a remarkable speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the Soviet Union, on March 10, 1939, saying: “A war against the interests of England, France and the United States?” Nonsense, said Stalin, “the Fascists reply that we are waging war on the Comintern.” But, he continued, “war is inexorable, it cannot be hidden under any guise. For no ‘Axes,’ ‘Triangles’ or ‘Anti-Comintern Pacts’ can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain—and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive States. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.”

The aggressors, continued Stalin, “in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors. Incredible, but true.” Why was it? The chief reason, he said, was an eagerness not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work “in order that they might become embroiled with others, especially the Soviet Union.” He cited “the hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine.” The “gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on the Soviet Ukraine” from the Carpathian Ukraine (the tip of Czechoslovakia), “not later than this Spring.” Certain European and American pressmen and politicians were losing patience, “putting it down in black and white” that the Germans were talking about colonies, instead of marching to the East.

“Far be it from me to moralize,” continued Stalin. “It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality,” but, he remarked, “the big and dangerous game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.”

“The foreign policy of the Soviet Union” was “clear and explicit.” He summarized it under four heads: (1) peace and business relations with all; (2) “close and friendly relations” with all countries on the borders of the U.S.S.R.; (3) “support of nations which are victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country”; (4) “two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.”

This warning went unheeded in the West. Russia was still rightly counted in the anti-Axis front, though an unwanted partner. When Czechoslovakia was occupied on March 15, both of Litvinov’s requests for a conference were rejected by the West, yet he presented a separate protest to Germany on March 19. He refused to recognize either the legality or justice of Germany’s latest seizure. He called it “a new blow to the feeling of security of nations.”⁷

Thus, on March 19, 1939, Russia was still an opponent of Nazi aggression. Then on April 6 Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that a pact of mutual assistance was being concluded with Poland, and a week later a similar guarantee was given to Rumania. These paper guarantees, which Britain had no power whatever to carry through, constituted one of the most amazing episodes of the appeasement era. But still more astonishing was the British proposal of April 15 that Russia give a unilateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania, accompanied as it was by procrastination on the Soviet counter proposal of a joint military agreement to defend all the border states between Russia and Germany.⁸

Turning-point. It was immediately after this that Merekalov, the Russian Ambassador to Germany, on April 17, paid his first call to the German Foreign Office since he had presented his credentials on June 5, 1938. He came to explore a recent intimation to him that Germany was willing to cultivate and expand her economic relations with Russia. The memorandum of this friendly exchange of views between Merekalov and State Secretary Weizsäcker is the first document in Nazi-Soviet Relations.

Soon after this, on May 3, 1939, Litvinov was abruptly replaced as Russian Foreign Minister by Molotov, a move which so impressed Hitler that he promptly sent to Moscow for Hilger, who displeased the Führer by describing the growing strength of the Soviet regime. Hitler, who was “constantly chewing his finger nails,” thought that Hilger might have fallen victim to Soviet propaganda, but if not “then we have no time to lose in taking measures to prevent any further consolidation of Soviet power.”⁹

Ten days later the German Embassy in Moscow was ordered to begin discussions about a new trade agreement.¹⁰ On May 20, Molotov suggested to the German Ambassador, Count Friedrich von Schulenburg, that the Soviet Government would be glad to resume commercial negotiations, if the necessary “political bases” for them had been constructed. Schulenburg strove to find out what he meant, but “all of my determined efforts to bring Herr Molotov to make his wishes more definite and more concrete were in vain.”

This inclined the Germans to “sit tight” and “to inject ourselves with an impeding and disturbing effect into the English-Russian negotiations,” the success of which they thought “certainly will not be easy to prevent.” Yet on May 23, Hitler told his assembled chiefs that the Soviet Union must be induced to cooperate in the isolation of Poland or it would not be achieved,¹¹ and on May 30 Schulenburg was notified that “we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union.”

On June 15 the Soviet Chargé in Berlin dropped hints to the Bulgarian Minister to Germany that Russia was undecided, but that if a non-aggression pact were offered her by Germany, with guarantees that Russia would not be invaded by Germany through the Baltic States or Rumania, Russia would probably accept it. This important tip was promptly passed on to the Germans and after July 22 the economic negotiations were resumed.¹²

Moscow Still Undecided? The German economic negotiator, Schnurre, reported on July 27 his impression that “Moscow had not yet decided what they want to do . . . after months of negotiations with England,” and that in the economic negotiations “the Russians absolutely reserve the tempo to themselves.” He also encountered “excessive distrust,” a frequent complaint of the Germans.¹³

On August 4 Schulenburg reported a long conversation with Molotov in which Molotov stated that a peaceful solution of the Polish question “depended first of all upon us,” i.e. Germany. The Ambassador concluded his report with the statement: “My over-all impression is that the Soviet Government is at present determined to sign with England and France if they fulfill all Soviet wishes.” It would “take considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing about.”¹⁴

This was late in the eleventh hour, when the British and French military missions were leisurely wending their way to Moscow by slow boat through the Baltic, after waiting a week before they started. Schulenburg did not suspect how little the British and French Governments wanted an alliance with Russia, but by August 7 he had discovered that his rival negotiators were having difficulties. He had learned that “throughout Herr Molotov sat like a bump on a log. He hardly opened his mouth, and if he did it was to utter only the brief remark: ‘Your statements do not appear to me entirely satisfactory. I shall notify my Government.’” The British and French Ambassadors were “both said to be completely exhausted and glad that they now have a breathing spell ahead of them. The Frenchman said to one of my informants, ‘Thank God that that fellow will not participate in the military negotiations!’”¹⁵

Molotov was evidently a quite uncooperative and suspicious fellow. Schulenburg recorded: “At every word and at every step, one can see the great distrust toward us.” Schulenburg could say this without hypocrisy because he was one of the few surviving members of the “Eastern School” in the German diplomatic service. He sincerely believed in permanent cooperation with Russia.

The pain of the Soviet leaders as the moment of decision neared is apparent. They dreaded a pact with Germany, yet the West offered them nothing. With Schulenburg, Molotov was courteous, but on August 14 he still insisted that trouble over Poland could come only from Germany, an indication that his aversion to German aggression had not lessened.

German Pressure. By this time the Germans were getting in a hurry. The Führer’s time-table called for war on Poland on September 1. Only two weeks remained. So on August 14 Foreign Secretary Ribbentrop sent a Most Urgent dispatch to Schulenburg directing him to state to Molotov: (1) that “ideological contradictions” need not prevent the ending of opposition in their foreign policies “once and for all”; (2) no real conflict of interests existed—there was “no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which could not be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries”; (3) “an historic turning point” had come—now would be decided whether the two peoples would some day again “take up arms against each other” or again be friendly; (4) “the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians” had never disappeared; (5) the capitalistic Western democracies were the enemies of both; and (6) speedy clarification of relations was desirable. “Otherwise these matters, without any German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Soviet friendship and possibly of clearing up jointly the territorial question of Eastern Europe.”

Schulenburg was instructed to read this message to both Molotov and Stalin, but to leave no copy, and to add that Ribbentrop would be ready to come to Moscow for a short visit to conclude matters.

Here was an offer which compelled decision, in sharp contrast to the anemic negotiations with the Allies. It was clear that Germany urgently desired the pact and was willing to pay well to get it. It was just as clear, too, that the alternative was likely to be an early war with Germany. The German note plainly put the issue of peace or war in points 3 and 6. Aside from any immediate intent by Hitler to attack Russia if she did not come to terms now, a clash would be almost “inevitable,” not at some unspecified future time, but during the next few weeks. In the absence of a deal, German armies would roll through the White Russian and Ukraine districts of Poland up to Russia’s borders, and perhaps over into Rumania—Bessarabia. But still more explosive was the Baltic States question. If Russia allowed them to be occupied by Germany the defense of Leningrad was almost hopeless. So a Russian rush into these areas, colliding with a German drive to occupy them first was the probable outcome; either that or the seizure of these vital areas by German fifth columns.¹⁶

Final Negotiations. The hour of decision had come. Molotov met it by stressing to Schulenburg the importance of a non-aggression pact and agreement about the Baltic states. Ribbentrop agreed and urged haste. On the 18th, Molotov replied with a formal note which he both read and gave to Schulenburg.

The Russian note first put the past record straight, as follows:

“The Soviet Government has taken cognizance of the statement of the German Government transmitted by Count Schulenburg on August 15 concerning its desire for a real improvement in the political relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R.

“In view of the official statements of individual representatives of the German Government which have not infrequently had an unfriendly and even hostile character with reference to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government up till very recently has had the impression that the German Government was working for an excuse for a clash with the U.S.S.R., was preparing itself for such a clash, and was basing the necessity of its constantly increasing armament on the inevitability of such a clash. Not to mention the fact that the German Government by means of the so-called ‘Anti-Comintern Pact’ was attempting to build up a unified front of a group of states against the U.S.S.R., and was attempting with especial persistence to draw Japan in.

“It is understandable that such a policy on the part of the German Government compelled the U.S.S.R. to take serious steps in the preparation of a defense against possible aggression on the part of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and also to participate in the organization of a defensive front of a group of states against such an aggression.

“If, however, the German Government now undertakes a change from the old policy in the direction of a sincere improvement in political relations with the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government can look upon such a change only with pleasure and is on its own part prepared to alter its policy in the direction of an appreciable [ernsthaften] improvement in relations with Germany.”

The note specified that economic agreements be concluded first, to be followed after a short interval by the non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government was gratified by the willingness of the German Foreign Minister to come to Moscow. “This stood in noteworthy contrast to England, who, in the person of Strang, had sent only an official of the second class to Moscow.” However, Molotov would rather conclude the agreements through diplomatic channels.¹⁷

Ribbentrop replied instantly that he must come. On the 19th, Moscow submitted its draft of the non-aggression pact, which Hitler promptly approved in a message to Stalin, urging August 23 as the latest date for Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow. This was accepted and Ribbentrop came by air, armed with authority from Hitler giving him “full power to negotiate” the treaty “as well as all related questions” and “other agreements resulting.” All agreements would go into force the moment Ribbentrop signed them. In other words, he was empowered to sign anything. The Führer was now really in a hurry.¹⁸

This readiness to deal offered a sharp contrast to the conduct of the British and French, who had used the past six months in finding reasons why they could not come to an agreement with Russia.

In Moscow, Ribbentrop “indulged in overwhelming declarations of friendship,” which Stalin received dryly. Stalin impressed Hilger with his “simple and unpretentious behavior,” with “a certain jovial friendliness,” and with his remarkable technical knowledge in various fields. In the negotiations he did not hide his distrust of England, but “spoke with unconcealed respect of the United States and particularly her economic achievements.”¹⁹

Among the Russian people Hilger noted many doubts about the suddenly announced Russo-German friendship, and fears of what Germany would do after she had conquered Poland, but the general reaction was one of relief from the “war scare which had weighed on them like a nightmare since 1933.”²⁰

The Nazi-Soviet Pacts. The Non-Aggression Treaty concluded on August 23 bound the parties: (1) to “desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other either individually or jointly with other powers”; (2) to give no aid to any belligerent enemy of the other; (3) to maintain “continual contact” for consultation about “problems affecting their common interests”; (4) not to take part even indirectly in any grouping hostile to either; and (5) to settle any disputes or conflicts by friendly exchange or through arbitration commissions.

The Secret Protocol named the northern boundary of Lithuania as the line between “the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R.” Through Poland the line ran approximately along the rivers Narew, Vistula and San. Finally, “With regard to South-eastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.” The text of this last article is important because of later disagreement between the two parties over South-eastern Europe.²¹

This is the pact which former Secretary of State Byrnes said in 1947 was not worth the paper on which it was written because “the Soviet Government concluded the pact while fully intending to violate it.”²² Is this a fair appraisal of the facts?

That both sides regarded the pact as a purely temporary arrangement is certain, though the German Embassy in Moscow sincerely believed that the pact would lead to a Polish settlement without war and promote peace. It was Russia’s problem to keep from being attacked before her time had come on the Nazi time-table, and it was Hitler’s aim to seize the proper moment. At first he was delighted with his bargain, believing it would intimidate the West into keeping quiet during his conquest of Poland. On August 23, the day the pact was published, Hitler told his Commanders-in-Chief: “The enemy had another hope—that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not reckon with my great powers of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich.”²³ On the same day his Finance Minister was telling the Italian Foreign Minister in Rome that the Führer “did not believe in a war with England and France.” His whole experience with them, culminating in Munich, convinced him that the Nazi-Soviet Pact would keep them quiet.

He was wrong on the Allied reaction, because the British and French leaders had discovered belatedly that in all probability Hitler did not mean to leave them in his rear while he disposed of the Soviets. This deep suspicion was confirmed by his pact with the Soviets, which obliged them to fight. The pact surprised them, since they had hoped to neutralize Russia and deter Hitler with the appearance of negotiations in Moscow, but when the treaty was announced they had no choice but to fight. They would fight the only kind of war of which these men were capable, a defensive, sitting-behind-the-Maginot-Line and economic-blockade conflict.

The Munich men were now compelled to declare war on Hitler when he invaded Poland. They did so, on September 3–4, 1939, feeling that their sea blockade would hurt him far more than any economic aid he might get from the Reds, with their very weak economic system.

Hitler, of course, was greatly irked, but he felt he had made a fine bargain. Poland was promptly and easily destroyed, and after it was all over he made another speech to his Commanders-in-Chief, on November 23, 1939, in which he boasted that “what has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front. The other front is at present free. But no one can know how long it will remain so. At present Russia is not dangerous. She is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are kept only as long as they serve their purpose.” Then Hitler added three very significant sentences: “We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further, Russia is striving to increase her influence in the Balkans and towards the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy.”²⁴

Conflict at the Straits. Here were the two factors which would determine the duration of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The German and Russian paths crossed in the Balkans, as they always had for many decades. It was not likely that either would grant the other a free sweep in this vitally strategic region. As a former Rumanian Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Russia, Grigore Gafencu, remarked: “After the U.S.S.R. had regained the old northern frontiers, it was natural that she should also revive her hopes for the south.”²⁵ The clash would come when Hitler was free enough in the West to take over the Balkans.

In the meantime, the partition of Poland had taken place without any conflict between the Soviets and Germans. The lightning speed of the German conquest led the German Government to telegraph very urgently on September 3, 1939, requesting Russia to occupy her sphere of influence in Poland at once, in order that the Germans be relieved of pursuing retreating Polish troops beyond the agreed line. Molotov at first said, on the 5th, that the time had not yet come, but admitted on the 10th that the German speed had taken the Russians by surprise. Molotov sought to avoid a joint announcement of Russia’s entry into the Polish struggle, but agreed when Stalin’s draft was accepted.

Molotov had not only world opinion to consider, but his own skeptical people. Schulenburg wired to Berlin on September 6 that “the statements of official agitators that Germany is no longer an aggressor run into considerable doubt.” The Russian people feared “that Germany, after she has defeated Poland, may turn against the Soviet Union.” In the absence of the pact and the official propaganda, that fear would have been justifiably keen.²⁶

Premonitions of a clash in the Balkans arose very early. On October 3, when Schulenburg mentioned rumors that England and France intended to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order to set up a Balkan front, “Molotov asserted spontaneously that the Soviet Government would never tolerate pressure on Bulgaria.” On October 12 Berlin reported that Molotov had been thinking of a Russian-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact in the event of an attack by a third power, but “This suggestion was rejected in Sofia.”²⁷

The Russian winter war on Finland—November 26, 1939, to February 12, 1940—went badly for two months, but the Germans loyally kept hands off. Then the humiliated Soviets pushed military preparations in earnest. Gafencu observed throughout 1940 the strengthening of discipline in the army. Saluting was restored and he observed Russian recruits doing “their best, as though it was a strange joke, to salute.” All the old regalia of militarism was restored but “these were only the outward signs of the gigantic effort imposed on all the financial and economic resources, all the forces of labour and production of the vast Empire, in hammering out the most formidable war machine that Russia had ever known.”²⁸

Trade Agreements Loyally Fulfilled. The trade agreements which accompanied the truce played an important part in the Soviet Union’s military preparations. The original trade agreement of August 19, 1939, provided that Russia would send great quantities of raw materials, “lumber, cotton, feed grain, oil cake, phosphate, raw furs and other goods.”

In return the Russians were to receive “machinery and industrial installations. Machine tools up to the very largest dimensions” formed “a considerable part of the deliveries,” and “armaments in the broader sense (such as optical supplies, armor plate and the like) were supplied in smaller proportion.

For the purchase of these industrial goods Russia received a credit of 200 million Reichsmarks. Apart from this sum, the Germans estimated that the movement of goods envisaged by the agreement might exceed one billion Reichsmarks.

From the first both sides tried to expedite deliveries from the other. In this game deliveries were sometimes delayed to compel performance on the other side. In October, Schnurre, the top economic negotiator of the Germans, noted that the Russian goods could only be sent at the expense of Russian consumption. In December, General Keitel complained that machine tools for the manufacture of munitions simply could not be spared to the Russians.

But on February 11, 1940, a still more comprehensive trade agreement was concluded, after long and difficult negotiations, in spite of “the ever present distrust” of the Russian negotiators. Everything had to be referred to Stalin. Nevertheless, the Germans expected to get 1,000,000 tons of grain, 900,000 tons of oil, 100,000 tons of cotton, 500,000 tons of phosphates and much else. The freight rate on 1,000,000 tons of soya beans from Manchuria was cut in half. Precious war metals were promised, along with purchases for Germany in world markets. In sum, “the agreement means a wide open door to the East for us.”²⁹

Again the Russians were to receive “industrial products, industrial processes and installations as well as war material.” There were extensive negotiations about the sending of new warship hulls and other naval arms to Russia. On September 26, 1940, Schnurre wrote that the Führer would have to decide between fulfilment of promises to Russia and the armament demands of the Army. Germany was already heavily in arrears on deliveries and a suspension of Russian deliveries was to be expected. On two other occasions Hitler decided that deliveries to the Russians must be made, though toward the end they were delayed or sent by such circuitous routes that they never arrived.

On the Russian side, General Thomas, Chief of the German War Industry Department, recorded that “the Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack. Even during the last few days, transports of India rubber from the Far East were completed by express transit trains.”³⁰

This was not because the Russians did not expect to be attacked. As early as September 18, 1940, the Germans learned about anti-German propaganda in the Red Army, and interpreted it as a response to fear of attack by Germany.³¹ The Kremlin fulfilled its economic commitments to the end because it was determined to give Hitler no cause to attack. Until late in the day, also, the industrial and war materials received from Germany were a very important supplement to Russia’s armament efforts. The raw materials which Germany received were mostly perishable, while the arms and machines received by Russia remained when war came.

Fear in Moscow in the Spring. Russia was protected during 1940 by Hitler’s unsettled account with the West, though there was a time of desperate anxiety in Moscow in the Spring. Schulenburg was mystified. He sent a long memorandum on April 11, 1940, detailing the strange conduct of the Russians. For some time everything that they did had been “unfavorable to us. In all fields we suddenly came up against obstacles,” which “reached their climax in the suspension of petroleum and grain shipments to us.” He tried to find out the reason from trade commissar Mikoyan, but found him only negative. “We asked ourselves in vain” for the reason. “After all nothing had ‘happened’!”

Then Schulenburg saw Molotov on April 9, after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. “Herr Molotov was affability itself, willingly received all our complaints and promised relief.” The grain and oil would start moving again at once. It was “a complete about face.” It was plain that “our Scandinavian operations must have relieved the Soviet Government enormously—removed a great burden of anxiety.” The day’s article in Izvestia about our Scandinavian campaign sounded “like one big sigh of relief.” He could only explain it as fear that the English and French were about to occupy Norway and Sweden, reopening the Finnish question with Russia. The Soviet Government, added Schulenburg, “is always extraordinarily well informed.”³²

It is quite possible that Schulenburg had his tongue in his cheek in explaining the relief in Moscow. It is hardly likely that the Kremlin was terrified by what the distant and quiescent Allies would do. It is much more probable that they were on tenterhooks for fear that Hitler might alter his time-table and turn on them first. When he did go the other way they knew that they were probably safe for the fighting season of 1940 and that the German-Soviet pact was not to be as quickly abortive as the Munich pact.

Russia was safe for the summer, while Hitler’s panzer divisions rampaged through Holland, Belgium and France, driving the British into the sea at Dunkirk. Then there was a pause, from June 20, 1940, until the air battle for Britain began on August 8. On August 17 the first German directive for “Operation Sea Lion,” the great invasion of Britain, was given, but the Battle of Britain was never won. It was definitely lost on September 15, the day 185 German aircraft were shot down. Without command of the skies “Sea Lion” could not go forward.

The German Attack on Russia Long Planned. By the end of August it was clear that the air battle was being lost, and Hitler’s thoughts at once turned toward Russia. General Paulus, of Stalingrad fame, testified that “he first heard of the proposed attack on Russia on September 3, 1940,” when the Chief of the General Staff, Holder, “handed over to me the plan for the attack, in so far as it had already been prepared, and told me to examine the possibilities of the attack. The forces required were between 130 and 140 divisions.” On September 6, 1940, General Jodl also issued from Hitler’s headquarters an order to the Counter Intelligence Service containing elaborate instructions for deceiving the Russians about the military preparations in the East, improvements on railroads, roads, airfields, etc., and the increases in troop concentrations.³³

During August 1940 Sam E. Woods, our commercial attaché in Berlin, learned that plans for war with Russia were being made at Hitler’s headquarters, and from that time on he was able to keep our Government informed of important steps in the preparations.³⁴

On October 3, 1941, Hitler himself identified August and September 1940 as the time when he turned on Russia, saying: “In August and September 1940, one thing was becoming clear. A decision in the West with England which would have contained the whole German Luftwaffe was no longer possible, for in my rear stood a State which was getting ready to proceed against me at such a moment.”³⁵ Hitler could not say, of course, that his air force was already contained, that is whipped. He knew well also that there was no danger whatever of an attack by Russia, and had so stated on July 21, 1940.

August 1940 is therefore quite conclusively established as the time when the detailed planning for attack on Russia began. The loss of the air battle for Britain removed any doubt in Hitler’s mind about the time of the Russian invasion, though in all probability it had been set for the Spring of 1941 long before. If Britain were conquered in 1940 Russia would obviously be the target in 1941, and if the invasion of Britain failed in 1940 then Russia would be the only great prize available in 1941. On August 14, 1940, General Thomas was informed that the Führer “desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until the Spring of 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.”³⁶ Since this news, coming through Goering, was probably not instantaneously fresh, and since on August 14 the Battle of Britain was only six days old, it would seem clear that Russia was down on Hitler’s time-table for 1941, even before the grab for Britain began.

The decision to conquer Russia had been reached long before. The editors of the Nuremberg documents put it in one sentence: “The view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of lebensraum at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology.”³⁷ Goering told a Council of Ministers on September 4, 1936, that the German rearmament program started “from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable.” Admiral Raeder left a memorandum of January 10, 1944, in which he quoted Hitler as planning during 1937–8 to settle accounts with Russia. General Jodl stated in a secret speech at Munich, on November 7, 1943, that “during the Western campaign,” that is before the fall of France on June 17, 1940, “Hitler informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps” against the Russian “danger.” Soon after, on July 21, 1940, Hitler informed Raeder that “even though Russia views Germany’s great successes with tears in her eyes, she herself has no intention of entering the war against Germany.” There was also no urgent need to attack her, for Hitler went on to say that “war material is plentiful, and the food supply is secure. The fuel situation is the most difficult part, but as long as Rumania and Russia deliver and the hydroelectric works can be safeguarded against air attacks, it is not critical.”³⁸

Nevertheless, Russia’s time had come. The desire to possess her great natural resources was fixed. Here only could the real lebensrawn be achieved. To be sure Germany was getting the products of Russia in great quantities, but she was having to pay well for them, and the deliveries could be stopped. It was a central tenet of fascism that it is foolish to pay for anything you can take by force. Besides, Hitler had an enormous army on his hands with nothing to do. It could not end the war with Britain by invading her and there is no more dangerous liability than a huge unemployed army. Current necessity therefore reinforced the permanent lust of the Nazis for the Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Urals.

The documents quoted above show clearly that the decision to begin the detailed planning for an attack on Russia was made in August and September 1940, but we hardly need the Nuremberg documents to establish Hitler’s objective. A predatory regime acknowledging no law or principle except force and possessed of tremendous striking power, could be depended on to turn to the nearest great prize when blocked in one direction. We do not require any diplomatic quarrels between Berlin and Moscow to explain the German assault on Russia. It would have happened in the absence of any dispute and substantially at the time it occurred.

The attack on Russia, the swift blow which all the world expected to give Germany great riches in six weeks’ time, would also have occurred in the absence of any conflict of interest between Germany and Russia in the Balkans.

Rumania Guaranteed. There was a power conflict between them in the Balkans. The old German Drang Nach Osten of pre-1914 days was stronger than ever in the Nazis, who had no intention of stopping at the Bosphorus when the regime of William II had penetrated beyond. The Soviets, too, responded to the age-old desire of the Tsars to control the Turkish Straits, their chief commercial outlet, and make the Black Sea a Russian lake. On August 20, 1940, Admiral Raeder’s Chief of Staff summarized Russia’s longterm aims as an ice-free port on the North Atlantic, an advance to the Persian Gulf and an advance through the Balkans to the Dardanelles. This is an estimate of Russian aims which anyone could make by a brief study of a map of the tremendous land-locked Russian area. The Russian urge to have secure access to the seas is historic and perpetual. It has always centered, and still centers, on the Dardanelles.

Being well aware of this axiom, the Germans hastened to lock the Balkan gate against Russia in the summer of 1940. They did not like the Russian seizure of Bessarabia, at the moment when they were still mopping up France. Though this area had been written off in the pact with Russia, its acquisition by Russia did not help German prestige. The Germans protested also against the Russian occupation of Bukovina, a small Rumanian province which Russia claimed as inhabited by Ukrainians. Since this area was not in the bond the Germans objected and it was agreed that Russia would take only the northern part of the province.

These tensions were the result of Russia’s efforts to strengthen her position at a time when Hitler’s victories in the West had put him in “a mental state bordering on megalomania.” Stalin had counted on the Maginot Line holding a long time, but it didn’t and now Hitler was rapidly talking himself into making “an end of Bolshevism” and seizing the German lebensraum.³⁹

Prompt action in the Balkans was indicated to Hitler by the fact that Russia’s recovery of Bessarabia brought her down to the lower Danube and its mouths, nearer to control of the Black Sea, and closer to the Turkish Straits. They must make sure, the Nazis decided, that Russia advanced no further. Russia had been stopped here, or on the Dniester, by European coalitions in 1856 and 1878, and the Nazis meant to do no less. They therefore invited the Rumanian Minister, Manoilescu, to Vienna for August 29, and when he arrived compelled him to accept a division of the long disputed Rumanian province of Transylvania with Hungary. This move was explained to the Russians, after the event, on August 31, 1940, as an urgent “arbitration” which had to be made quickly to prevent serious trouble between Hungary and Rumania. It was “imperative that the last remaining territorial problem should not lead to an armed conflict.”⁴⁰

Actually the “Vienna Award” stirred such violent feelings in Rumania that the Nazi overlord was thereafter required to keep the peace, a result which had probably been anticipated in Berlin. The alleged danger of a Russian descent on Rumania proper was the main argument used to dragoon the Rumanians into accepting the award,⁴¹ which guaranteed Rumania’s new frontiers. Since this guarantee could only be aimed at Russia, Molotov was “reserved, in contrast to his usual manner,” when notified by Schulenburg. “He asked me to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that by its action it had violated article 3 of the Non-Aggression Pact, which provided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted with accomplished facts by the German Government. . . . The present case involved two of the Soviet Union’s neighbors, where she naturally had interests.”⁴²

In reply the German Government maintained that “the existence of mutual interests in the meaning of the Non-Aggression Pact of Moscow is out of the question here.” The Soviet Government had given Germany very short notice of its intention to occupy Bessarabia, “which also gave impetus for the launching of revisionist demands on Rumania,” and had not always practised consultation in the Baltic region, especially with regard to Lithuania. Molotov persisted in his “view that the conduct of the German Government in Vienna was not entirely in good faith as it could not have been in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania and Hungary.” The Soviet Government, however, by no means disputed the “fact that Germany had special interests in Rumania.” It would have been glad to assure Germany unequivocally that “it had no aggressive designs on Rumania.” A long four-page memorandum of September 21 refuted the German contention at all points and offered to negotiate an amendment or deletion of Article 2 of the Non-Aggression Treaty, if Germany desired.⁴³

It is about the disputes of this period that Byrnes comments: “Hitler began to be irritated. Evidently, he felt that Germans were shedding blood for the territory they got, and the Soviet Union was insisting upon taking the spoils without the fighting. . . . Suspicions began to grow on both sides.”⁴⁴ The Rumanian Minister to Russia estimated the same diplomatic interchanges as follows: “The realism of the leaders in Moscow pushed them to extreme prudence. It was necessary to let the unfaithful partner know that they were neither deceived by his actions nor accepted his discards; but this without arousing his mistrust or provoking his anger.” The Kremlin sought “no more than an expression of reproach, a recall to order, an invitation to new and fruitful dealings.” He adds also that in the German Embassy in Moscow “the opinion was that Berlin had acted in too cavalier a manner toward her Soviet partner.”⁴⁵

Schulenburg did not know that the Rumanian guarantee against Russia was forced upon Rumania immediately after the detailed planning for war on Russia had begun in Berlin. Hitler was making sure of a source of war supplies and of a springboard for his assault on Russia.

Danubian Deadlock. On their part the Russians were intent on asserting their newly recovered position as a Danubian state. When a Vienna conference was called by Germany to establish a provisional administration on the upper reaches of the Danube, Russia insisted, on September 11, 1940, that she should be invited. The Conference of Paris in 1856, after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war had established the European commission of the Danube, a remarkable supra-national body on which most of the European powers were represented. It had broad administrative, judicial and political powers over a comparatively short stretch of the lower Danube, with its own patrol boat and flag. The long reaches of the upper Danube were governed by a later body, the International Commission of the Danube, which had only technical and administrative powers.

Russia made it clear that she especially wanted both to get rid of the European Commission, which held the mouths of the Danube against her, and to share in the control of the Danube throughout its entire length. This was an old Tsarist ambition and one which was completely unacceptable to the Germans, who had staked out exclusive control of the Danubian region for themselves. In early October German troops entered Rumania and were quartered along the Danube, opposite the new Russian province of Bessarabia. Their presence was explained to Russia, afterward, as simply for instructional purposes. A few weeks later Russia-took over several islands on the opposite side of one of the main Danubian channels through the delta, after trying to get Rumania to agree to yield control.

A conference was held at Bucharest from October 28 to December 21, 1940, in which Russia’s will to control the mouths of the Danube, and the Black Sea, clashed with Germany’s determination to exercise the same control and to block Russia’s southward advance toward the Straits. The conference could reach no agreement, but it did define the conflicting ambitions of Russia and Germany in the Balkans. “The passage to the Southern Seas by way of the Straits of Constantinople remained the major problem of Russian policy” and the Germans were determined to secure the land bridge through Constantinople to Africa, by way of “Iraq with its petrol and Egypt with its cotton.”

The Tripartite Pact. September 1940 also brought another severe jolt to Soviet-German relations. On September 26, Berlin gave Moscow a one-day warning of the signing of the Three Power Pact, whereby Japan became a member of the Rome-Berlin Axis. This military alliance was explained to Moscow as “directed exclusively against American war mongers.” This was stressed three times and it was, indeed, the main purpose of the pact to intimidate the United States, which was moving powerfully to the aid of Great Britain. Yet the new alliance was equally applicable against Russia. The three aggressors could, if permitted to grow stronger effectively encircle the U.S.A., but they could much more easily attack the U.S.S.R. from both sides, and the Russians knew well that they would like to do so.

Molotov listened to the news of the Triplice pact. Then before commenting on it he inquired about the reported military agreement between Germany and Finland, and the landing of German troops at three Finnish ports without Russia having been informed by Germany. The Germans, of course, said that the troops in Finland were merely in transit to Norway. The arrangements were “purely technical.” It soon transpired, however, that they included the supply of war material to Finland.⁴⁶

Berlin Conference. In view of these developments and after repeated urgent invitations for Molotov to repay Ribbentrop’s two visits to Moscow the German invitation was accepted on October 22, for November 12. On that day a conference was held in Berlin between Molotov and Ribbentrop. The latter reviewed the course of the war. Only bad weather delayed a great attack on England, who could hope for no vital aid from the U.S.A. “Regarding possible military operations by land, the entry of the United States into the war was of no consequence at all for Germany. Germany and Italy would never again allow an Anglo-Saxon to land on the European Continent.” The question whether America entered the war or not was “a matter of complete indifference to Germany.”

Regarding the Triple Alliance Pact he suggested that all four powers should expand toward the South. Japan was now headed that way. Germany had aspirations in Central Africa and perhaps Russia could get her “natural outlet to the open sea” through Persia, though Germany would be glad to have a new arrangement at the Turkish Straits which would “grant to the warships and merchant fleet of the Soviet Union in principle freer access to the Mediterranean than heretofore.”

The Germans proposed a vertical division of the Old World, whereby Africa, and presumably the Near East, would go to Germany and Italy. Japan would get China and South East Asia, and Russia access to the ocean through Persia. This division of the world is definitely proposed in Secret Protocol No. 1 of a proposed four-power draft, tying Russia into the Triple Alliance, which was sent to Schulenburg. No mention of the Near East is made, but the constant effort to turn Russia’s attention to Persia and the Indian Ocean is good evidence that she was to have no share of the Levant. On four different occasions during the Berlin talks the Germans pointed toward the Indian Ocean.

The Straits were also discussed repeatedly and the Germans offered a revision of the Montreux Convention which would permit only the warships of Black Sea Powers to use the Straits. Molotov, however, was not impressed by paper assurances. He wanted a military base on the Straits. In his second talk with Hitler, on November 13, he also inquired, according to the German record, “what Germany would say if Russia gave Bulgaria, that is, the independent country located closest to the Straits, a guarantee under exactly the same conditions as Germany and Italy had given one to Rumania.” Very shortly thereafter he again brought up the question, giving assurances that Russia had no intention of interfering in Bulgaria’s internal affairs. In reply Hitler first defended his own guarantee to Rumania and then said that “the question would first arise whether Bulgaria herself had asked for such a guarantee. He did not know of any request by Bulgaria” and he would also have to consult Italy. (It might be remarked that this was the first time that the Führer’s delicate feeling for the sovereignty of a small country had manifested itself.)⁴⁷

This is the point at which Byrnes believes Hitler decided to make war on Russia. He says that “it was here that Molotov made his worst blunder. He insisted on a definite answer. The interpreter’s report says that at this point Hitler showed great indignation.” Until I see other evidence, Byrnes declared, “I shall believe that this was the decisive moment. Certain it is that from this fateful November 13, Russo-German relations steadily declined.” These talks, says Byrnes, “in my opinion, marked the turning point of the war . . . a decisive point in history. For Mr. Molotov greatly overplayed his hand. His interview with Hitler on the thirteenth, particularly, stands out as a major diplomatic blunder.”⁴⁸

The State Department’s volume, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, does not contain any “interpreter’s report” of the Berlin talks. The official report contains no reference to Hitler’s indignation or to any insistence by Molotov on a definite, immediate answer to his Bulgarian proposal. Molotov did press the point, but the final statement in the record of the conversation says: “Molotov stressed that he was not asking the Führer for a final decision, but that he was only asking for a provisional expression of opinion.” Hilger, who was present at all of the Berlin talks, does not record any indignation on Hitler’s part, but he does say that after Hitler’s “grandiose but vague” plans for dividing the world, Molotov’s insistence on clearing up the existing frictions made two things clear: “Hitler’s intention to push the Soviet Union in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and his unwillingness to acknowledge any Soviet interests in Europe.”⁴⁹

The German reports of the Berlin conversations fill 37 pages. They show the Germans endeavoring repeatedly to convince Molotov that the big attack against Britain was still coming off; that Germany had now “acquired such large areas that she would require one hundred years to utilize them fully”: that she was still thinking about expanding in Africa; that she had “no territorial interests in the Balkans, (thrice stressed) her interests there being “confined exclusively to the economic field” and motivated exclusively by the circumstances of our war against England”; and that Germany “had no political interest of any kind in Finland.”

Byrnes’ account suggests strongly that Molotov made a mistake in not dividing up the world with the Axis, as Hitler was proposing so expansively, instead of arguing about “what Hitler must have regarded as relatively trivial things—Rumania’s boundary, a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria.” Remembering his own long and exhausting negotiations with Molotov, Byrnes felt that Molotov’s insistence on discussing all the questions of the moment sounded like “an agenda for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers!”

Certain it is that Molotov pressed the Germans strongly on both Finland and the Balkans. The sending of German troops to Finland, especially without prior notice, was an obvious violation of the agreement between Germany and Russia, which put Finland in Russia’s sphere of influence. In both Finland and the Balkans Germany was assembling troops on Russia’s flanks in areas where the Russians believed Britain was impotent to strike. Beside the immediate threat of these maneuvers the possible acquisition of an outlet to the Persian Gulf did not seem very alluring, especially since Russia would find Britain defending South Persia, as of old. Molotov knew, before Hitler told him, that Germany “had at her disposal an extraordinarily large number of divisions, and her air force was constantly growing stronger.” Having read the returns from the Battle of Britain, Molotov was concerned about the employment of these huge German forces. He therefore made Finland and the Balkans the test of future Russo-German relations.

Moscow’s Conditions. After his return to Moscow a formal note on November 26 stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the proposed Four Power Pact, subject to four conditions: (1) “that German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland”; (2) “that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria . . . and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by means of a long term lease”; (3) “that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union”; and (4) that Japan renounce her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.⁵⁰

These conditions are obviously listed in order of importance. Russia would be glad to expand south from Batum and Baku, especially since protection for her very vulnerable oilfields would be secured, but Finland and the Balkan-Straits questions came first. If German military occupation of these two areas were not halted Russia would soon be completely walled off by the German army from Europe and from the world, except through her icy windows.

No German reply to Moscow’s four conditions was ever sent, but the news of the day gave the Russians their reply. King Boris of Bulgaria was in Berlin three days after Molotov left, though he avoided commitment to either side for some time. Hungary signed the Triple Alliance on November 20, Rumania on November 23 and Slovakia on the 24th. Bulgaria signed on March 1, 1941, and was at once occupied by German troops.

German War Plans Pushed. While Hitler was sounding Molotov and holding out entrancing pictures of a world to be divided, including a vast bankrupt British estate, General Jodl and his staff were busy working on the details of the plans for “Barbarossa,” the invasion of Russia. On December 5, 1940, General Haider reported to Hitler on the progress of the plans. Hitler approved them, adding that the enemy was to be prevented from withdrawing on a closed front,⁵¹ a direction which his armies were never able to carry out.

Before the Berlin talks the Russian leaders had “turned their full attention to the army. Preparations were speeded up in factories, in military maneuvers and on the frontiers. The morale of the army was jealously guarded and its combatant spirit stimulated. The press, radio and every other means of propaganda stirred patriotism.”⁵² Hitler was not lulling the Russians as much as he hoped.

On December 18, German Army Directive No. 21 was issued as the basic strategical directive to all the armed forces for Operation Barbarossa. They must be prepared “to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign.” Preparations requiring considerable time were to begin soon and be finished by May 15, 1941. Great caution was to be “exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.”⁵³

The most elaborate plans were made for deceit, but it was in their plans for the economic looting and management of the conquered areas that the Germans outdid themselves in justifying their reputation for thoroughness.⁵⁴

On January 7, 1941, a circular letter was sent to several German embassies, warning them of troop concentrations in Rumania and suggesting “as a plausible reason” mention of precautionary measures against England. On the 17th the Kremlin made a strongly worded protest against the German inundation of the Balkans, saying that “it will consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the U.S.S.R.” On February 22, 1941, Schulenburg was instructed to announce that 680,000 German troops were now in Rumania. This was preparatory to the occupation of Bulgaria on March 1, of which Russia was notified as the operation began.⁵⁵

At this point there occurred the somewhat fantastic interlude of Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s odyssey to Moscow, Berlin and Rome.

Russo-Japanese Pact. If Hitler was expansive in his talks with Molotov he was doubly so in impressing Matsuoka during two long discussions on March 27. A huge army of 240 combat divisions was at his command. It was practically idle and could be employed at any time and at any place he considered necessary. Relations with Russia were correct, but, confidentially Russia had been making conditions lately. “Should Russia some day take a stand that could be interpreted as a threat to Germany,” he would crush Russia.

From Ribbentrop, Matsuoka received another series of not too thinly veiled hints about action against Russia. Matsuoka therefore minimized the non-aggression pact which he had proposed to Russia while in Moscow and Ribbentrop advised him that when he returned to Moscow “only a purely formal, superficial handling of these points was advisable.” Then Matsuoka returned to Moscow and negotiated desperately for some kind of pact. His position in Japan was shaky and he needed a success. Tokyo was also anxious not to fight Russia while Japan disposed of the United States and Britain in the Pacific. The Soviets would not agree to a non-aggression pact, but they would agree to a neutrality treaty, if it be absolute, without any exceptions. They wished to make sure of Japan’s neutrality in the event of an attack by Germany. The negotiations stalled for days over Stalin’s demand that the Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin be cancelled. When Matsuoka finally received authority to make this agreement the pact was speedily concluded. When Matsuoka’s train left, on April 13, Stalin went down to the station to see him off, to the great surprise of the diplomatic corps which was assembled on the platform. After telling the Japanese goodbye, Schulenburg reported, “then Stalin publicly asked for me, and when he found me he came up to me and threw his arm around my shoulders: ‘We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end!’”⁵⁶

Stalin had reason for his good humor. He had made a pact which probably would, and in fact did, relieve him from the mortal danger of a war on two fronts, if Germany attacked. The Germans tried to prevent the pact and did everything they could during their Russian blitz to persuade Japan to attack Russia, but to no avail. When the Germans attacked Russia on June 22, 1941, they were still true to their aim of avoiding a two-front war. The British were helpless to invade the continent and could only annoy them from the air. A year later the Germans did find themselves involved in a two-front war which was fatal to them. The same thing happened to the Japanese. The British and the Americans fought victoriously on many fronts. Only the Russians managed to pull through on the basis of one front at a time.

Yugoslavia and Greece Crushed. Russia’s deal with Japan was made none too soon, for on March 21 the conservative regime of Prince Paul in Yugoslavia yielded to a German ultimatum and signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna the next day. Yugoslavia was entirely surrounded by the Axis and it was easy to reason that resistance was hopeless. But now there occurred one of those unexpected risings of the people which occasionally upset all the calculations of appeasers and dictators. The cunning and selfish policy inaugurated by the Yugoslav Minister Stoyadinovitch seemed to have paid off. Fawning on Hitler and refusing all communion with the other Balkan victims of Hitler had seemed to give immunity, and now fervent German promises were made to leave Yugoslavia strictly alone. The people, however, felt differently. Revulsion and rebellion swept the entire country. Plain people of every occupation indignantly revolted, peasants and townspeople alike. The people knew what “adhesion” to the Axis meant and swept the Government out of power overnight on March 27.

A few days later, on April 5, the U.S.S.R. blessed the rebellion with a nonaggression pact signed with Yugoslavia in Moscow, in Stalin’s presence. No assistance was promised to Yugoslavia, only respect for her “independence, sovereignty and integrity,” but Russian defiance of Berlin was plain. The next day the German armies swept into Yugoslavia, alleging, as usual, English machinations. The Nazis had to act instantly, for two reasons. The heartwarming example of the Yugoslavs was stirring the other Balkan peoples to consider whether they too should throw all discretion to the winds and strike for freedom. But equally vital was the delay in the invasion of Russia which the Yugoslav revolt caused. It was essential to have the Balkans firmly under control, including Greece, before beginning the assault on Russia. So the Germans acted in furious haste and with total brutality. Hungary was forced to join in the attack, dishonoring a recently signed treaty with Yugoslavia, and when her Premier, Paul Teleki, killed himself rather than violate his pledge, a more compliant premier was at once put in office. Belgrade was blitzed from the air in the first day, as Rotterdam had been on the last day of Holland’s brief resistance, not because either was a military objective, but vengefully to deprive of their chief possession little peoples who defied the Nazis. Armies poured into Yugoslavia from four of her neighbors and by April 17 organized resistance was ended. Simultaneously, German armed might swept over heroic little Greece, whose peasant troops had defeated the Italians and rendered them helpless. Athens fell on April 27 and Crete was taken from the British by air a few days later. At a cost of only 2500 killed the Germans had taken nearly 600,000 prisoners.

The resistance of the Greeks and Yugoslavs was “hopeless,” yet it gave hope to all mankind and very probably prevented the conquest of the old world by the Nazis. Such “futile,” immortal resistance had not been expected by Berlin. Hitler had taken over all the other Balkan states one at a time without war. He did not expect the last of his victims to resist. When they did he threw everything at them and annihilated all resistance in one furious lunge. But the lunge set back his Russian time-table from May 15 to June 22.

Hitler’s Time-table Upset. Admiral Raeder’s diary stated that “the extension of operations into Yugoslavia delayed ‘Barbarossa’ for about five weeks,” and General Paulus later testified at Nuremberg that on April 1 “Barbarossa” was postponed for about five weeks from the middle of May.⁵⁷

In the early winter of 1941 the German flood almost overwhelmed Moscow. It was turned back partly with the aid of the bitter cold which the Germans had not expected to interfere with their six weeks’ Russian blitz. If they had been able to start their grand assault on May 15, especially in the south, their chances of overrunning European Russia would have been very sharply enhanced. There would have been five weeks more time in which to pause for breath and to organize new lunges. We do not know certainly that the five weeks made the difference, but the self-sacrificing heroism of the Yugoslavs and the Greeks may well have prevented all Europe from falling under the regressive rule of the Nazi supermen for a very long period.

Moscow Awaits Attack. Moscow was not heroic after the fall of Yugoslavia. On April 12 a new oil agreement was signed with Germany. After a short interval recognition was withdrawn from the ministers of all the Nazi-conquered Balkan states, including Yugoslavia. Russia was now effectively encircled, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Stalin had miscalculated again in believing that the Serbs would occupy Hitler a long time. Now the Führer was genuinely angry because of Stalin’s moral aid to the Yugoslavs and thereafter Stalin “left no stone unturned to appease Germany.” But Hitler saw in the “constant efforts” of the Russians to prevent a conflict only proof of their weakness and his golden opportunity to get his lebensraum.⁵⁸

On April 22 the Narkomindal again requested Germany to stop the flights of German planes over Russia’s borders, eighty violations being alleged from March 27 to April 18. One German plane made an emergency landing near Rovno on April 15, in which, says Schulenburg, “were found a camera, some rolls of exposed film, and a torn topographical map of the districts of the U.S.S.R., all of which gives evidence of the purpose of the crew of the plane.” On May 17 Schulenburg was still trying to obtain the release of its crew.⁵⁹

On April 24 the German Naval Attaché in Moscow reported to Berlin: “Rumors current here of alleged danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union and are being fed here by travellers passing through Germany. According to the Counsellor of the Italian Embassy, the British Ambassador predicts June 22 as the day of the outbreak of war.”⁶⁰

The British secret service had discovered the new invasion date. This information was passed on to the Russians. U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had also given Moscow a similar warning, strongly and emphatically, as early as January.

There was no reply to either communication. The Soviets were determined not to give the Germans any excuse to attack because of traffic with the Anglo-Saxons. Stalin himself continued to doubt that Hitler would strike.⁶¹

Hilger believed that Stalin thought Hitler was getting ready to make extortionate demands which could be handled by negotiation.⁶²

On their side the Nazis counted heavily on a great swing of sentiment to their side throughout the West, even in the Anglo-Saxon lands. Their years of bitter fulminations against communism and Russia must have left a deep residue in the minds of Western conservatives and socialists. Surely when the Nazis actually did attack the hated Reds the world would rally to the German side, or at least abate much of its resistance to the New Order. The Number Two Nazi, Rudolph Hess, flew to Scotland to persuade the British aristocracy to see the light.

Two Ambassadors’ Attempts to Avert War. The last weeks before the German invasion of Russia were “a tragic experience” for the German officials in Moscow. In mid-April they resolved upon an effort to make clear to Hitler the dangers of a Russian war. A careful memorandum was prepared on which several of the top Embassy officials collaborated. Schulenburg then took the document to Berlin and, after Hitler had had ample time to digest it, the Ambassador was summoned for a short interview on April 28, 1941. Though the memorandum lay before him Hitler never referred to it, limiting himself to “general and meaningless statements” and to a casual remark at the close that he did “not intend a war against Russia.”⁶³

During the interview Schulenburg did his best to defend Russia against any aggressive intent in concluding the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia. About the Russian fear of a German attack, Hitler insisted that the Russians had moved first, concentrating many divisions in the Baltic States. Schulenburg replied that this was due to the “well-known Russian urge for 300 per cent security.” He could not believe that Russia would ever attack Germany. Hitler practically agreed. “He did not, it was true, believe that Russia could be brought to attack Germany, but strong instincts of hatred had survived, nevertheless, and, above all, Russia’s determination to approach closer to Finland and the Dardanelles was unchanged, as Molotov had allowed clearly to be seen on his visit. When he considered all this he was obliged to be careful.”⁶⁴

Schulenburg had long since ceased to close his letters with a “Heil Hitler.” In 1944, after the abortive effort to kill Hitler, Schulenburg was executed for complicity in the plot. He may, or may not, have been guilty, but there is no doubt that he believed Hitler to be Germany’s destroyer. Returning to Moscow certain that the die had been cast, and knowing that disaster loomed ahead for Germany, Schulenburg agreed with Hilger that they must risk their own heads in an attempt to persuade the Russians to involve Hitler in negotiations so deeply that he would have no excuse to attack, for the time being at least. In their desperation they had a secret meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin and the Chief of the German Section of the Russian Foreign Office, in which they “talked and talked,” but accomplished nothing. The two Russians could not comprehend the Germans risking their lives, or speaking only as individuals, and thought they were playing Hitler’s game, trying to soften up the Russians.⁶⁵

Once before an ambassador with a long residence in Moscow had sought to restrain his master from hurling himself into Russia’s vast spaces. Before Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 Ambassador Caulaincourt had pleaded with him for five hours not to commit so great a mistake. He pledged his head to Napoleon that Tsar Alexander would “not fire the first shot, nor be the first to cross his frontiers.” If attacked the Russians would yield space, let their iron climate fight for them and never make peace. Napoleon listened, displeased. He distrusted Alexander and he insisted that it was necessary to convince England that she would not be able to find any ally on the Continent. Napoleon invaded Russia and met his downfall.⁶⁶

Napoleon disregarded the advice of the Ambassador who sought to save him. So did Hitler. Schulenburg knew that Russia was a world. His specialists had studied it long and thoroughly. They believed that if German armies did destroy the Red regime nothing would remain, and that nothing but “profound and irremediable” anarchy could be substituted for it. The hold of the Red regime on the people was too complete. If it were destroyed the Reich armies “would go forward in darkness, through indescribable confusion,” provoking “a new revolution, a revolution of general disintegration,” which would strike at both the vanquished and the attackers.⁶⁷

Grave Doubt in Berlin. Though not equipped with Schulenburg’s exhaustive knowledge of Russia, Weizsäcker, the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, could see that the assault on Russia would be self-defeating. He wrote, on April 28, 1941: “I can summarize in one sentence my views on a German-Russian conflict. If every Russian city reduced to ashes were as valuable to us as a sunken British warship, I should advocate the German-Russian war for this summer; but I believe we would be the victors over Russia only in a military sense, and would, on the other hand, lose in an economic sense.” The sole decisive test was whether this project would hasten the fall of England. If it be assumed that England is close to collapse then there was no need to attack Russia, since “Russia is no potential ally of the English.” If England is still strong, then an attempt to feed ourselves by force from Soviet territory would be frustrated by passive resistance. The Stalin system would carry on the war from beyond the Urals and “the window to the Pacific Ocean would remain shut.” A German attack on Russia “would only give the British new moral strength.”

Nothing was more probable, but the Nazis thought it needless to pay for what they could take by force. Schnurre, their chief economic negotiator, listed on May 15, the very great deliveries being made by the Russians, “a notable performance.” Evidently he doubted the wisdom of disrupting this great trade, but Hitler had explained it all to Minister Todt and General Keitel: “What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer.”⁶⁸

Schulenburg’s Final Protests. On May 2 Schulenburg sent a sharp note to Berlin saying that he and all the higher officials of his Embassy had always combated rumors of a German-Russian war. Now he asked Berlin please to bear in mind, “that attempts to counteract these rumors here in Moscow must necessarily remain ineffectual if such rumors incessantly reach here from Germany, and if every foreigner who comes to Moscow or travels through Moscow not only brings these rumors along, but can even confirm them by citing facts.” Berlin replied that the same war rumors were current in Berlin. England was suspected of poisoning the wells, and the unjustified Russian troop concentration across the border added to the rumors. Only such German forces were posted there as were absolutely necessary as rear cover for the Balkan operations. Schulenburg was to keep on denying the rumors.⁶⁹

Schulenburg closed his friendly interpretation of Stalin’s assumption of the post of Prime Minister, which took place on May 6, with the statement, “I firmly believe that, in an international situation which he considers serious, Stalin has set himself the goal of preserving the Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany.” On May 24, he reported an interview with Molotov, who was “as amiable, self-assured and well-informed as ever.” All the evidence in Moscow showed that Russian foreign policy was “directed, above all, at the avoidance of a conflict with Germany.”⁷⁰

Moscow’s Last Word. This was demonstrated with finality on June 14, 1941, by a remarkable communique issued by the Soviet news agency Tass. This statement ascribed to the British and denied emphatically the rumors that Germany had presented demands to Russia and that because they had been rejected both sides were concentrating troops for conflict. Germany was respecting the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact. The movement of German troops northward did not concern the relations of the two countries. The Russian troop movements were for training only and the U.S.S.R. “has respected and intends to respect” the Pact with Germany.

This statement can be read as a final appeal of Russia for peace. It must have been intended also to convince the Soviet peoples that nothing had been done to provoke war. Yet it had precisely the opposite effect on many people. Having been assured only a week before that Germany was a loyal ally, they suspected that their own government must have done something to precipitate the attack. The Soviet policy of avoiding anything which Hitler could seize upon as a provocation also left the Soviet peoples without “the slightest psychological preparation” for the German attack. Soviet patriotism had been strengthened on a generalized basis as much as possible, but the German assault caught a large part of the Soviet peoples totally by surprise and was “one of the reasons for the lack of fighting spirit” in the first stage of the war, when many troops surrendered and some sections of the populace welcomed the Germans.⁷¹ Heretofore, this reaction has been ascribed solely to dislike of Soviet rule, which was doubtless the primary motivation. Later, some Russians thought that their government must have been deceived, but no one believed it had incurred the attack.

Hitler Spiritually Free. On June 21, Hitler sent a letter to Mussolini telling him how afraid he had been that the Russians would attack him, or spoil a mighty future air blitz on England. Consequently, there was now about to be “war in the East,” about which he did not “entertain a second’s doubt as to its great success.” If he had “waited until this moment, Duce, to send you this information,” it was “because the final decision itself will not be made until 7:00 o’clock tonight.” He begged Mussolini not to inform his Ambassador in Moscow. He, too, would “wait until the last moment to have my own Ambassador informed of the decisions reached.”

After thus assuring his ally that the mighty decision was still to be made, Hitler concluded by saying that since “I struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free.” He undoubtedly hoped that a host of people in the West who greatly feared communism would feel spiritual kinship with him from then on.

Many did, but the verdict of the editors of the Nuremberg documents, assembled for the international court which judged Nazi crimes, was: “it may perhaps not be too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign nations, a blacker chapter has never been written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators’ unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union.”⁷²

Was the Nazi-Soviet Truce a Mistake? The ordeal ahead for Russia was a frightful one, but on the fifth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times appraised it as a victory for Stalin. He described the Allies’ policy of ignoring Russia and later seeking to promote war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany “in a fairly obvious fashion.” This policy had been consistently developed during the twenty years between the two World Wars, mostly by London and Paris, “with Washington following in some confusion far behind.” This policy had boomeranged for the Allies and when Hitler broke the truce and attacked, his major calculations also proved false.⁷³

Russian Expansionist Tendencies. What does the record of the German-Soviet truce period show about Soviet expansionism?

Three aspects of this question require comment.

1. Soviet Seizures Agreed Upon in the Pact. These include: Latvia, Estonia, half of Poland and Bessarabia. All of these areas were seized as defense buffers against Germany. They are all valuable strategic zones, but the Baltic States region is the most vital.

When someone asked Hindenburg why he insisted on having the Baltic provinces of Russia in the Peace of Brest-Litovsk of 1918, he replied: “To give my left wing room to maneuver in the next war”; and at a planning conference on “Barbarossa,” on February 3, 1941, Hitler approved the operational plan, but stressed that “the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.”⁷⁴

2. Soviet Acquisitions in Excess of the Pact. The most substantial of these was Lithuania, which was obtained from Germany in exchange for the Lublin district of Poland on September 27, 1939, during Ribbentrop’s second visit to Moscow. Soviet troops also occupied a relatively small Lithuanian strip which had not been allotted to them. After extended negotiation Russia offered Germany “half the price of Alaska” for it and later doubled this sum to 7,500,000 gold dollars, which offer was accepted early in January 1941.

The acquisition of North Bukovina has been described above. In this case Russia’s original claim was cut in half, but in drawing the line Molotov’s red pencil slipped and a small tip of Moldavia was annexed. Though an accident had apparently occurred, Molotov refused to return this area.

These cases show that the Soviets were quite alert to round out their new borders and that once they had occupied an acre they would not give it up.

3. Permanent Russian Objectives. The German-Russian negotiations of November 1940 disclosed two Russian objectives which are still unrealized, a share in the physical control of the Turkish Straits and expansion to the south of Batum and Baku, toward the Persian Gulf.

Taken together these acquisitions and aspirations indicate that in a time of great flux the Soviets reverted to virtually all of the territorial aims of Imperial Russia. The same factors do not show a Russia seized with a maniacal desire to conquer the world, either in Europe or Asia. This was the role of Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. As Hilger says, Hitler was so “inebriated” by success, and so “crazed” with the idea that this was the moment to achieve his life’s dreams that nothing could change his “resolve to give the Soviet Union the coup de grâce.”⁷⁵

Red Russia on the defensive practised a bold, acquisitive defense, though shrewd and prudent, against foes who would hardly have respected a supine or passive defense.

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